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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
HYRUM WILLIAMS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
- vs.-
THE OGDEN UNION RAIL.WAY 
AND DEPOT COMPANY, a cor-
poration, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
7471' 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The parties will be designated as in the trial court. 
All italics are ours. 
All record citations of testimony will be followed 
by -1 or -2 to indicate whether said testimony was re-
ceived at the first or second trial. 
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Hyrum Williams., an employee of The Ogden Union 
Railway and Depot Company, was injured within de-
fendant's ·yards at Ogden, Weber County, Utah, at ap-
proximately 7 :10 A.M. on the 9th day of D-ecember, 1946 
while in the course of his employment as a switch tender 
for said company. 
This action was commenced in the Second Judicial 
District, in and for Weber County, State of Utah, on 
the 26th day of February, 1948. The case was first 
tried before the Honorable John A. Hendricks, com-
mencing on the 26th day of May, 1948, the jury returning 
a verdict in favor of plaintiff in the sum of $20,000.00 
total verdict, with diminution by reason of contributory 
negligence in the sum of $8,000.00, .and a net verdict in 
the sum of $12,000.00 (R. 057). 
Defendant filed a motion for new trial and said 
Judge, after the motion had been argued by respective 
counsel, granted plaintiff the choice of accepting a 
$9,000.00 reduction in the net verdict, leaving a net 
recovery of $3,000.00, or a new trial. Plaintiff, faced 
with this choice, accep·ted a new trial (R. 240-2). 
The case was tried a second time before the Hon-
orable F. W. Keller, commencing on the 16th day of 
November, 1948, the jury returning a verdict of No 
Cause for .Action in favor of the defendant and against 
the plaintiff. Thereafter, plaintiff moved for . a new 
trial and plaintiff's motion was, on the 29th day of 
September, 1949, denied by said Judge (R. 245-2). 
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Plaintiff hereby appeals fron1 the order of ,Judg'l' 
Hendrieks granting· defendant's n1otion for nP\Y trial 
and also from eertain errors eormnitted by the I-Ionorable 
F. ,, .... Keller, Judge during the progress of thP second 
trial of the case. 
The facts pertaining to liability 'Yill be related upon 
the basis of the testimony at the second trial inasinuch 
as certain errors of la".,.' \Yhich "Till be set forth and dis-
cussed in this brief, took place at the second trial. 
The facts pertaining to damages \Yill be related 
upon the basis of the testimony taken at the first trial 
inasmuch as those facts will be referred to in relation to 
charged error of Judge Hendricks in granting defend-
ant's motion for new trial following the first trial of 
this cause. 
B. THE FACTS 
Hyrum Williams, age 68, and a lifetime employee 
of the defendant company, was injured while in the 
course of his employment at app·roximately 7 :10 A.M. 
on the 9th day of December, 1946 when he slipi>·ed on 
icy switch ties while manipulating railroad switch No. 
2 near the Weber River bridge, Ogden, Utah (R. 15-2, 
20-2). At the time of his injuries plaintiff was working 
as a switch tender tending three switches, one east, and 
two west of the Weber River bridge (R. 2, R-2). He 
had worked pursuant to said assignment since 1942. 
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The tracks, switches and general area where plain-
tiff worked are clearly shown in defendant's Exhibit 
'' 1' '. < i enerally speaking the we·stbound and eastbound 
main line tracks extend in an easterly-westerly direction, 
with the westbound main line track to the south. These 
tracks extend over the Weber River by a bridge and a 
short distance east of the bridge the balloon track circles 
a \\~ay from the westbound main line track in a general 
southeasterly direction. West of the Weber River bridge 
a crossover, extending in southeasterly-northwesterly 
direction, connects the westbound and eastbound main 
line tracks. Switch No. 1 connects the crossover with 
the eastbound main line track and switch No. 2 connects 
the crossover with the westbound main line track and 
is the switch where plaintiff was injured. A switch 
shanty is located just south of the crossover. The bal-
loon switch is approximately three-quarters of a block 
from the shanty (R. 19-2). 
During the months and years prior to December 
9 1946 an average of between eight and ten trains 
' ' would pass the switches over which plain tiff had juris-
diction during an eight hour shift. Every time these 
trains moved along the eastbound or westbound main 
line tracks the duty of the switch tender required that 
he manipulate the switches under his control so as to 
accommodate the movement of these trains (R. 8-2). 
Whenever a train used the crossover, switches Nos. 1 
and 2 would have to be changed :and then returned to 
their normal positions (R. 1~-2). 
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.... \t all times it is the duty of the section rrt)\vs, work-
ing under the section foreman to keep the switches and 
the area around the s'vitches clean and in good working 
condition (R. 11, 12, 89-92, 145-147 -2). If it snows and 
storms, section cre,vs are railed out as soon as ~possible 
to clean the s"\vitches and the area around the switches 
where workmen are required to stand or move in the 
manipulation of the switches (R. 11, 12, 90, 91, 145-2). 
David Danielson, section foreman in general charge 
of maintenance work from Roy, Utah to Weber River 
bridge, within which area is located switches Nos. 1 and 
2, testified that following a storm on the 7th day of 
December, 1946 he dispatched a member of his crew 
to clean five switches, two of which were switches Nos. 
1 and 2, and that his workman spent six hours on that 
day cleaning the switches (R. 213-2). On the 8th day 
of December, 1946 there was some precipitation of wet 
snow which ended at approximately 12:45 P.M. This 
was the last precipitation that occurred before plaintiff 
was injured. (Exs. "L", "M" and "13"). Thereafter, 
Mr. Danielson dispatched a man to clean the five 
switches, among which w-ere switches Nos. 1 a.nd 2, and 
he worked fo.r a period of six hours during the after-
noon of December 8th, 1946 on said assignment (R. 213, 
215, 216-2). During the evening of the 8th and the early 
morning hours of the 9th the temp,erature hovered at or 
near freezing ( Exs. "L ", "M" and "13 "). 
On the 9th day of December, 1946, plaintiff reported 
for duty at approximately 6:50 to 6:55 A. M. (R. 15-2). 
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It \\'as a dark, cloudy morning, below freezing in tem-
perature (R. 15, 16-2). His shift was from 7:00 A.M. 
to 3 :00 P.M. Upon reporting for duty plaintiff received 
noti(·P that passenger train No. 30 was on the balloon 
traek Past of the Weber River bridge ready to proceed 
in a westerly direction along the westbound main line 
track across the crossover and onto the eastbound main 
line track, and also that extra freight train No. 5300 
"·as approaching along the westbound main line track 
in an easterly direction. His duty therefore required 
him to stop the freight train, manipulate the switches 
necessary for the movement of the passenger train 
from the balloon track to the westbound main line track, 
over the crossover, to the eastbound main line track 
and to then change the switches in order that the freight 
train could proceed along its course on the westbound 
main line track. In addition, another train at Patterson 
Avenue was waiting until the manipulations, heretofore 
mentioned, had_ been completed so that it could proceed 
along its course (R. 20-2). Plaintiff, therefore, with 
his lantern in hand, walked three-quarters of a block 
from the shanty to the balloon switch, changed that 
switch, returned to No. 2 switch, changed it, then to the 
No. 1 switch, changed it, and the 'IJassenger train pro-
ceeded along its course. Thereafter, plaintiff relined 
No. 1 switch to its normal position, proceeded to No. 2 
switch, and while manipulating it, was U]jured (R. 
15-17-2). 
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He testified regarding the happening of the acci-
dent as follo"~s (R. 20-2): 
'•Q. .A.s you approached switch No. 2 I want 
you to tell the jury what you did . 
. A.. I "~alked from switch No. 1 to s\vitch 
No. 2 to line it up for the '''"est bound main line. 
By doing so that cleared the block to let that 
eastbound train out of the east yard. But I never 
completed throwing the S"\Yitch. 
Q. Did you get the switch handle unlocked 1 
A. I got the switch unlocked and the handle 
out of the lever and was in a position to throw, 
I just started to throw the switch when my feet 
slipped out from under me and I went between 
the switch rod and the tie.'' 
. .. . 
"A. Just as soon as I lifted the handle out 
there, the switch handle, why I grabbed the stand 
and throwed the switch around where my feet 
was on the switch ties and this leg went, the left 
leg went between the switch tie and the switch 
rod throwing me off balance and I fell forward, 
or toward the right and the east. Fell towards 
the bridge. 
Q. Will you step down, Mr. Williams, and 
in about the position I am in now or whatever 
position is best for you and use this 'P'ointer and 
demonstrate to the jury how this- accident hap-
pened, the actual movements you went through 
and what happened~ 
A. If that is the switch stand, take that for 
the switch stand, I come here and unlock the 
switch and let the switch lock down on its chain· 
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8 
and pull the handle out. After you pull the handle 
?ut it is generally so tight in the stock rail that 
1t lets the handle come around but then you get 
hold of t~e handle this way, standing in that 
position, and pull it just. around and put it down 
in the ratchet. 
Q. And about how far did you pull the handle 
"·hen you slipped on this occasion~ 
A. Oh, I don't know how far just exactly 
what you'd say it was. The two ratchets, it is 
just about a 40 degree, took it out of one ratchet 
and put it in the next one so the switch comes 
here and it has got to come around to here.'' 
Plaintiff is a man 5 feet 5 inches in height, weighing 
approximately 150 to 155 pounds, and wearing a size 
6'% shoe. There was sufficient space for his foot to slip 
bet,veen the switch tie and the bridle rod (R. 43, 44-2). 
Switchmen, in manipulating switches, adopt the 
means of manipulation most convenient for them. There 
are no rules or regulations as to how a man should 
stand in manipulating the switches (R. 46, 52, 53; 178, 
179, 201, 202, 205-2). Plaintiff had seen other men stand 
on the switch ties in manipulating the switch on fre-
quent occasions (R. 46-2), as had Beckett, a switchman 
with 28 years experience, who testified on behalf of 
plaintiff. Beckett himself had handled switches in a 
similar manner (R. 13'6-138-2). 
On the morning he was injured p~laintiff was wear-
ing a pair of shoes and new rubbers and was heavily 
· clothed because of the weather (R. 24-2). He had not 
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noticed ire on the ties and around the S\Yiteh bPfore he 
"·as injured for the reason that he had only bPPn on 
shift approximately ten Ininutes and had been Yery bu~y 
manipulating S\Yitrhes in order to facilitatP the moYe-
ment of the t"~o trains 'Yaiting for hin1 to aecon1plish 
his 'York (R. 45-2). He had stood on the 0 1pposite 8it1P 
of S\Yitch ~ o. 2 in thro,ving it earlier for the crossoYer. 
After plaintiff had slipped and fallen he observed a 
layer of ice on the switch ties and around the switch 
(R. 50-2). 
Beckett, learning that plain tiff had been injured, 
examined switch No. 2 shortly after 8 :00 o'clock· on the 
same morning and .testified that the switch ties were 
covered with ice and a little snow, and that the area 
around the switch was covered with snow (R. 141-143-2). 
Photographs produced by the defendant and identified 
as having been taken at 9 :00 A.M. on the day ·plaintiff 
was injured clearly and irrefutably indicate that ice and 
snow were on the ties where plaintiff was injured. Mr. 
Beckett identified Exhibits "I", '' J" and "K" as 
showing the area as it existed that morning. 
That the defendant had had adequate time within 
which to render plaintiff's place of work s.afe, was clear. 
No precipitation had occurred for over 18 hours before 
plaintiff was injured. During that time no salt nor sand 
had been thrown on the ties or in the area of the switch; 
no effort had been made to remove the ice or snow by 
means of a shovel which was located at the switch shanty; 
no call had been issued for the section crew to perform 
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10 
this work, and the two switch tenders who preceded 
'plaintiff on the job had made no effort to clean the 
switch ties or the area around the switches (R. 90 91-2 
' ' Exhibits "9", "10", R. 107, 146, 147-2). The switch 
shanties at other areas of the yard contained salt and 
sand for use in providing adequate footing following 
storms (R. 107-2). -
;Beckett testified upon the basis of 28 years of ex-
perience that when he observed a condition of ice and 
snow around a switch rendering footing insecure, he 
deemed it his duty to immediately notify the section 
foreman or chief in charge of the department to come 
and clean the switch and area, ·and that it was a common 
occurrence for section men to be called out during the 
night to perform such services (R. 146, 147-2). Section 
crews were on 24 hour call at all times (R. 215, 216-2). 
From the foregoing facts it is obvious that plaintiff 
on duty for ten minutes, confronted with .an emergency 
on a dark cold morning had no time nor means within 
' ' 
which to examine the switches or determine whether 
footing was safe and secure. On the other hand the 
defendant had more than sufficient time and means 
to have rendered footing ~ecure. During that time 
one man h.ad speJ:!.t 6 hours on five switches. From 
the photographs it is obvious that the switch- points 
and the moving parts of the switch had been cleaned 
since the storm. It is also obvious that the area where 
switchmen were required to stand and move in manip-
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ulating the sw·itrh had been OYt:\rlookt'd ( SPP Photo-
graphs). 
After he "~as injured plaintiff railed for help and 
R. 0. McBride, head brakeman of the freight train, a·p-
proaehed the s'Yitch "-here he "~as lying, picked hint 
up and carried hin1 to the shanty (R. 197 -·~). l\IcBride 
later relined the s"itch himself (R. 198-2). 
Plaintiff remained at the shanty and endured ex-
tensive pain for 30 to 40 minutes before the ambulance 
arrived and removed him to the hospital (R. 48-1). 
After his arrival at the hospital he was taken to the 
operating room where he remained approximately 45 
minutes to an hour while the doctor was applying a 
cast. During that time he endured extensive ·pain (R. 
49-1). 
Dr. L. S. Sycamore testified that plaintiff had sus-
tained a comminuted oblique fracture of the left tibia 
approximately three or four inches below the knee. That 
the fragments were in reasonably good position and 
alignment, with slight posterior displacement of- the 
distal fragments -at the time he applied the cast. There 
were two fractures approximately one . inch apart 
through the bone, slanting slightly (R. 24-26-1). Plain-
tiff remained in bed at the hospital for ten days, and 
on the tenth day was allowed out of bed for short periods 
of time (R. 27-1). On December 23, 1946 he was allowed 
to leave the hospital (R. 27-1). On January 7, 1947 
X-rays were taken showing the bone to be in good posi-
tion and the fracture line to be still quite distinct with 
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no bony union (R. 28-1). On January 31, 1947 X-rays 
were again taken revealing some callous formation but 
also revealing that bony union was not complete (R. 
29-1). On February 20, 1947 X-rays revealed callous 
forrnation and early incomplete bony union (R. 29-1). 
Approximately three months following his injuries the 
first cast was removed. Plaintiff was seen on March 
2;) by the doctor. At that time the fracture seemed to 
lH· healing and he was able to walk on crutches and to 
lJ(•ar weight for a few moments of time (R. 30-1). In 
!\fay of 1947 plaintiff again contacted Dr. Sycamore 
complaining of pain around the bone. X-r.ays revealed 
a fracture line extending through the callous formation 
as though a small amount of motion in the area had been 
present (R. 31-1). On May 26, 1947 plaintiff was hos-
pitalized for a period of 24 hours during which time 
another cast covering his leg and foot was appJied 
(R. 32-1). On June 30, 1947 X-rays revealed that the 
fracture line was becoming partially obliterated, and 
during the latter part of July or first part of August, 
1947 the second cast was removed (R. 32-1). 
Dr. Sycamore accounted for the re-fracture as being 
caused either by another injury or some slight torque 
in the leg at the time the first cast had been applied 
which didn't allow complete healing. He was unable to 
testify as to which of these reasons was more predomi-
nant (R. 36-1). Plaintiff himself testified that he had 
suffered no injuries or fall whatsoever following his 
injury on D-ecember 9, 1946 (R. 51-1). 
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During the long •period of tinH:~ that his lt'g had been 
in the casts plaintiff's n1uscles had atrophit:\d extpnsively 
and there was tenderness and pain and con1plete lack 
of strength in his left leg as late as September of 
1947 (R. 32, 51-52-1). He followed the doctor's instruc-
tions regarding massage and exercising implicitly (R. 
53-1). However, on September 3, 1947 he was sent to 
Salt Lake to the Chief Surgeon because of continued 
complaints of stiffness and soreness around the knee 
and ankle (R. 33-1). 
Plaintiff testified that during the periods of time 
that his leg was in a cast and thereafter he endured 
extreme discomfort, anguish, nervousness .and sleep-
lessness (R. 51-1). At the time of the first trial, more 
than fifteen months after his injury, he was unable to 
walk more than three or four blocks without extreme 
fatigue in his left leg and testified that under no circum-
stance could he perform the duties of a switch tender 
(R. 55-1). Because of retarded recovery and inability 
to perform the duties of his employment, Mr. Williams 
had been forced to retire from railroading (R. 54, 55-1). 
The superintendent had informed him that he had no 
alternative but to retire (R. 54-1). 
At tp.e time of his injuries plaintiff was earning 
between $250.00 and $260.00 ~er month (R. 56-1). 
Defendant offered no evidence on damages, and the 
testimony of Dr. Sycamore, plaintiff, .and his daughter, 
remains as the sole and only testimony concerning 
that subject. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
From the foregoing facts it is clear that plaintiff's 
causP of action rests upon a firm evidentiary basis and 
that he suffered and sustained very serious disabling 
lllJUl'leH. 
I>laintiff proposes to show that he was seriously 
prejudiced by errors which occurred at the first and 
second trials of his cause. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
' 1. The trial court erred at the second trial in refus-
ing to give plaintiff's Instruction No. 4. 
') The trial court erred at the second trial in refus-
ing to give plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 5. 
3. T-he trial court erred at the second trial in giving 
Instruction No. 7 wherein it defined "proximate cause." 
4. The trial court erred at the second trial in giv-
ing Instruction No. 10. 
5. The trial court erred at the second trial in giv-
ing Instruction No. 11. 
6. The trial court erred at the second trial in giv-
ing Instruction No. 12. 
7. The trial court erred at the second trial in giv-
ing Instruction No. 19. 
8. The trial court erred at the second trial in giv-
ing Instruction No. 23. 
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9. The trial court erred in granting defendant's 
motion for a new trial following the first trial. 
10. The trial court erred in refusing to grant plain-
tiff's motion for new trial following the second trial. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRE-
TION WHEN IT GRANTED DEFENDANT'S MO-
TION FOR NEW TRIAL FOLLOWING THE FIRST 
TRIAL (Statement of Points 9). 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERS-
IBLE ERROR AT THE SECOND TRIAL IN REFUS-
ING AND NEGLECTING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY 
AS TO PLAINTIFF'S THEORY OF LIABILITY 
(Statement of Points 1 and 4). 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERS-
IBLE ERROR AT THE SECOND TRIAL IN IN-
STRUCTION NO. 10 WHEN IT INSTRUCTED THE 
JURY THAT''* * * the me.re happening of the accident 
to plaintiff is no proof of negligence on the p:a.rt vf either 
the plaintiff or defendant or evidence of same.'' (State-
ment of Points 4). 
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POINT IV. 
'l'HE ri'RIAL COURT, AT THE SECOND TRIAL 
' 1~\~ U l V lN<} INSTRUCTION NO. 12, HAS REVIVED 
TIll~: DOCTRINE OF CONT~IBUTORY NEGLI-
a l~~NCE AS A COMPLETE BAR TO RECOVERY BY 
PI.JAINTIFF (Statement of Points 6). 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT, AT THE SECOND TRIAL, 
BY GIY'ING INSTRUCTION NO. 19, PLACED AN 
UN\\~ ARRANT ED BURDEN OF PROOF UPON THE 
SHOULDERS OF PLAINTIF·F AND IN EFFECT 
REVIVED THE DOCTRINES OF CONTRIBUTORY 
NEGLIGENCE AND ASSUMPTION OF RISK AS 
COMPLETE BARS TO RECOVERY BY PLAINTIFF 
(Statement of Points 7). 
POINT VI. 
THE JURY'S VERDICT IS CONTRARY TO 
IMPORTANT UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE 
PRESENTED AT THE TRIAL . 
.ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT .ABUSED ITS DISCRE-
TION WHE,N IT GRANTED DEFENDANT'S MO-
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TIO~ FOR XE,\"' 1-,Rl .. -\.L FOLLO,YI~"O ~r.II11~ l1,1H~11 
TRIA.L (State1nent of Point~ 9). 
In granting defendant\;: motion for ne'r trial follo\\'-
ing the first trial the court n1ade the foll<.n,ying state-
ment (R. ~-±0-2) : 
"THE COURT: I will tell you that you 
needn't argue any further. I am of the opinion 
this ,,~as excessiYe, and I am going to make this 
ruling: I had some misgivings about the motion 
for directed verdict and wondered if I shouldn't 
have granted it. I am now convinced that I 
should have granted that motion. I think that if 
there was negligence, $5,000 'vould have been 
sufficient total damages. The jury found that 
the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negli-
gence to the extent of 40%. I think this con-
tributory negligence was much more than that-
it was over 50%-but I will take it on the basis 
of 40% as the jury found, and if the plaintiff 
will accept $3,000 I will deny the motion for new 
trial; if not, the motion will be granted. 
''MR. BLACK: I don't think we will need to 
deliberate on that, your Honor. We won't accept 
it. We will take a new trial. 
''THE COURT: All right, the motion for new 
trial is gran ted. ' ' 
The court's misconception of duty in ruling upon 
a motion for new trial is readily apparent from the 
foregoing remarks. If the court were of the opinion 
that a directed verdict was proper, it was its duty to 
have entered an order accordingly in order that such 
a ruling could be prop,erly reviewed by an .appellate 
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court. The court however, made no such order. Rather, 
it chose to find that the jury's verdict was based upon 
1 )assion or prejudice. 
The jury's total verdict was $20,000.00. The sum 
of $8,000,00 was deducted for contributory negligence, 
leaving a net verdict of $12,000.00. The narrow question 
before this court is whether the trial court abused its 
discretion in finding that the verdict w.as based on 
passion and prejudice and, upon the basis of that find-
ing, confronting plaintiff with the inequitable burden 
of accepting either a $9,000.00 reduction in the total 
verdict or a new trial. 
It is manifestly clear that the discretionary tpower 
of trial courts in granting or denying a motion for new . 
trial is not a mental discretion giving effect to the will 
of the judge, but is a legal discretion to be exercised in 
conformity with the spirit and letter of the law. 
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, Sec. 104-40-2, reads as 
follows: 
''Grounds. 
''The former verdict or other decision may be 
vacated and a new trial granted on the app~ica­
tion of the party aggrieved, for any of the follo~­
ing causes materially affecting the substantial 
rights of such party: 
* * * * * * 
'' (5) Excessive damages, appearing to have 
been given under the influence of passion or 
prejudice. '' 
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Under the foregoing statute unless tht~ rt\eord and 
testimony at the trial fully justifiPs a finding- by thP 
trial court that the jury "~as motiYa ted hy passion anc l 
prejudice the trial court's action in granting a n1otion 
for new trial or remitting a portion of the vt}rdiet 
constitutes an abuse of discretion and is nothing short 
of a capricious and arbitrary exercise of po\YPr. This 
court has so stated in the case of Jensen v. Denver & R. 
G. R. Co., 44 Utah 100, 138 P. 1185, 1192, and has clearly 
affirm~d its power and duty of reviewing the trial court's 
action in requiring a remission or a new trial. The 
following language clearly expresses the Utah law on 
this subject: 
''Since statehood, and as announced in Nichols 
v. Railroad, 28 Utah, 319, 78 Pac. 866, it has 
repea_tedly and uniformly been held 'that the 
amount of the verdict, under our Constitution, 
is a matter wholly within the province of the trial 
court and jury; the same being a question of 
fact. Where, as here, there is any evidence to 
support the verdict, we have no power to pass 
upon it or to set the verdict aside as being ex-
cessive.' In Budd v. Salt Lake City Ry. Co., 23 
Utah, 515, 65 Pac. 486, it was said that it was 
'useless to longer incumber the records with 
such questions in such cases'; in Burt v. Utah 
Light & P. Co., 26 Utah, 157, 72 Pac. 497, that 
this court is unauthorized 'to review the evidence 
to determine whether or not the damages are 
excessive.' To the same effect are Brregger v. 
Railroad, 24 Utah, 391, 68 Pac. 140, Palmquist 
v. M. & M. Supply Co., 25 Utah, 257, 70 Pac. 994, 
and Railroad v. Russell, 27 Utah, 457, 7'6 Pac. 345. 
In these cases many other prior cases from this 
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jurisdiction are cited to the same effect. A rule 
so long and so firmly settled as this will not now 
be disturbed. The verdict is for $7,620. The 
defendant urges that, while there may be evidence 
to sup~port a verdict for compensatory damages 
for some substantial amount, yet there is no 
evidence to support this verdict, a verdict for 
$7,620. The argument but amounts to the claim 
that the verdict is excessive; that the amount 
rendered is greater than or in excess of that 
justified by the evidence. Of course·-neither party 
is e·ntitled to our judgment of what we, on the 
evidence, think the damages should be. "\V e are 
not the tribunal to measure that or to pass judg-
ment on it, and cannot review the evidence for 
any such purpose. 
''Neither is either party on that question 
entitled to· the judgment of the court below in 
a case of tort tried to a jury. Both parties, as 
to that, are entitled to the unprejudiced judg-
ment of the jury. That is exclusively within their 
province. Their power and discretion, when prop-
·erly exercised and when they have been properly 
directed .as to the measure of damages and the 
mode of assessing it, may not be interfered with 
merely because the court above or below may 
think the amount rendered is too large, or even 
may think it ap,pears to he larger than the evi-
dence apparently or fairly justifies. A court, 
vac.ating a verdict and granting a new trial by 
me.rely setting up his opinion or judgment against 
that of the jury, but usurp·s judicial power and 
prostitutes the constitutional trial by jury. Still 
the jury cannot be permitted to g'o unbridled and 
wnchecked. Hence the :Code that a new trial on 
motion of the aggrieved party may be gr.anted 
by the court below on the ground of 'excessive 
damages appearing to have been given wnder 
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the influence of passion or prejudice.' When-
ever that is made to appear, the court, when its 
action is properly invoked, should require a re-
mission or set the ve.rdict .aside and grant a neu; 
trial. But, before the court is justified to do that, 
it should clearly be made to appear that the jury 
totally mistook or disregarded the rules of law 
by 1vhich the damages were to be regulated, o.r 
wholly misconceived or disregarded all the evi-
dence, and by so doing committed gross and 
palpable error by rendering a verdict so enormous 
o.r outrageous or unjust as to be attributable 
to neither the charge nor the evidence, but only 
to passion or prejudice. Whether a new trial 
should or .should not be granted on this ground, 
of necessity, must largely rest within the. sound 
discretion of the t.rial court .. 
"Still that court, in such particular, is not 
supreme or beyond reach. Its action may never-
theless be inquired into and reviewed on an 
alleged abuse of discretion, o.r a .capricious or 
arbitrary exercise of power in such respect. Such 
a review is not a review of a question of fact, 
but of law. A ruling granting or refusing a 
motion fo.r a new trial is certainly reviewable 
when the proceedings with respect to it are prop-
erly preserved and presented.- That has not been 
questioned. Of course the ruling will not be dis-
turbed on evidence in conflict, or on matters in-
volving discretion. Yet our power to correct a 
plain .abuse of discretion or undo a mere capri-
cious or arbitrary exercis·e of power cannot be 
doubted. 
''We have said this much, in view of plain-
tiff's contention and of opinions heretofore some-
what loosely expressed at the bar, that in a case 
of tort tried to a jury, no matter how enormous 
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or flagrantly outrageous a verdict may be, the 
trial court alone is authorized to grant relief; 
and though that court may, by a clear .abuse of 
discretion, and by an arbitrary exercise of power, 
have gone as wild as did the jury and suffered 
an outrageous .and unjust verdict to stand, or 
on mere whimsi'Cal and capricious grounds set 
a verdict aside amply supp~orted by competent 
evidence, yet we are pow·erless to interfere. We 
do not so understand the prior decisions. In all 
of them where it was said this court is not 
authorized to review a question of excessive dam-
ages, such question being one of fact, the state-
ments are qualified, except to ascertain 'if there 
is any evidence to support the verdict,' 'except 
so far as may be necessary to determine ques-
tions of law.' We reaffirm that. And since an 
assignment based on a ruling alleged to have 
been made by an abuse of discretion or by a mere 
capricious or arbitrary exercise of power, in 
granting or refusing a new trial, presents a 
question of law, not of fact, we may as such 
review it.'' -
The question then arises as to what facts and 
circumstances in the case at bar justified Judge 
Hendricks in concluding that the jury's verdict was 
based upon passion and p~rejudice. 
The. evidence revealed that Hyrum Williams suf-
fered a very serious injury. The tibia, or weight-bearing 
bone of his left leg, was fractured in two places. He 
was hospitalized for a period of two weeks. A plaster 
cast was .applied. On January 31, 1947, almost two 
months following his injury, no bony union had oc-
curred. On February 20, 1947 bony union was still 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
incomplete. Three months after his InJury the doctor 
removed the cast, but on May 26, 1947 an X-ray again 
showed separation at the fracture site and another 
cast was placed upon his leg. On June 30, 1947 bony 
union was incomplete. On September 3, 1947, almost 
nine months following his injury, plaintiff was still 
unable to be on his leg for more than short p·eriods 
of time. He still suffered from extreme stiffness and 
soreness around the knee and ankle and his leg had 
atrophied extensively. 
At the time of the first trial, on February 26, 1948, 
almost 15 months following his injury, he was unable 
to walk more than 3 or 4 blocks at a time and testified 
that he was still physically unfit to perform the duties 
of a switch tender. 
His lost wages alone, up to the time of trial, 
amounted to $3,900.00. 
Based upon the foregoing evidence the trial court 
determined that the verdict was ''so enormous or out-
rageous or unjust as to be attributable to neither the 
charge nor the evidence, but only to passion or prej-
udice.'' 
It was the trial court's opinion that Hyrum Williams 
would have been entitled to a maximum of $1,100.00 
for 15 months of pain, suffering and loss of bodily 
function and for the pain, suffering, loss of bodily 
function and loss of wages he would undoubtedly suffer 
in the future. Think of it! $1,100 a legal maximu1n 
which the jury would be allowed to award plaintiff 
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for this serious cr~ppling injury. Is it any wonder that 
counsel for the plaintiff demanded a change of judge 
at the conclusion of these p~roceedings ~ If the jury 
had been influenced and motivated by passion and prej-
udice, why then would they have reduced the ve~dict 
in the amount of $8,000.00 for contributory negligence¥ 
The jury at all times during the progress of the trial 
listened attentively to the evidence, deliberated for more 
than an hour and forty-five minutes before returning 
the verdict, and in no manner whatsoever indicated that 
it was prejudiced or biased either for or against the 
plaintiff. On the other hand, it seems inconceivable that 
the trial court viewing the evidence on damages could 
have determined that a maximum of $1,100.00 for pain, 
suffering, and loss of bodily function, past and future, 
would be allowed by the court. If this be not an abuse 
of judicial discretion, what must the record reveal to 
establish abuse of legal discretion~ Had the court 
reduced the verdict by a lesser sum perhaps a different 
situation would have been presented, but here is a court 
that without any justification whatsoever reduces the 
jury's verdict by three-fourths, thereby giving to plain-
tiff only a little over three-fourths of what he actually 
lost in wages, completely disregarding 'Pain ·and suffer .. 
ing, loss of bodily function, both past and future, and 
comp~letely disregarding future lost wages. 
We submit that substantial rights were denied plain-
tiff by the court'·s arbitrary abuse of discretion in 
requiring plaintiff to accept a remittitur of $9,000.00 or 
~a new trial. It is manifestly clear that the discretion 
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exercised by the trial court 'vas not the legal discretion 
contemplated by our statutes and by the decisions of 
this Honorable Court, but 'Yas a discretion which gave 
effect solely to the "~in of the judge trying the case with 
utter and complete disregard for the uncontroverted 
evidence presented by plaintiff. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERS-
IBLE ERROR AT THE SECOND TRIAL IN REFUS-
ING AND NEGLECTING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY 
AS TO PLAINTIFF'S THEORY OF LIABILITY 
(Statement of Points 1 .and 4). 
There are no instructions given by the court which 
either alone, or in conjunction with each other, contain 
plaintiff's theory of recovery. 
Instruction No. 2 states: 
" * * * that a railroad company while engaged 
in interstate commerce shall be .liable jn damages 
to an employee suffering injuries while he is 
employed by such company in interstate com-
merce in cases where such injury results in 
whole or in part from the railroad· company's 
negljgence. * * * ' ' 
Instruction No. 9 reads as follows: 
''The plaintiff alleges that the defendant was 
guilty of negligence jn failing to furnish the 
plaintiff .a safe place to work, in the following 
particular : 
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''That the defendant allowed the ties on which 
the switch was located to hecome and remain 
covered with snow and ice, which caused them 
to be in a slick and slippery and unsafe condition. 
''These allegations of negligence .are denied 
by the defendant. Defendant alleges that the 
plaintiff's injuries were the result of his own 
negligence.'' 
Instruction No. 10 reads as follows : 
"The jury is instructed that the mere hap-
pening of the accident to plaintiff is no proof of 
negligence on the part of either the plaintiff or 
def.endant or evidence of same. Negligence is 
never presumed, but must be proved to your 
satisfaction by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Before the plaintiff can recover in this case the 
jury must believe from a preponderance of the 
evidence that the defendant was negligent in the 
manner set forth in Instruction No. 9 and that 
such negligence was a proximate cause of his 
.accident.'' 
Instructions No. 9 and No. 10, as hereinabove set 
forth, do not, either directly or by implication, state 
the duty defendant owed plaintiff and the violation, if 
any, which would constitute negligence and require a 
verdict in plaintiff's favor. These instructions approach 
the matter from the negative point of view and rather 
than setting forth plaintiff's theory of recovery they 
set forth defendant's theory of defense. 
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The only instruction "~ht'rein the duty owed plain-
tiff is discussed in Instruction No. 20. This instruction 
is set forth as follo,vs : 
''You are instructed that it was the duty of 
the defendant railroad com1pany to exercise rea-
sonable care to provide its employees a reason-
ably safe place to work. This duty does not 
require the absolute elimination of all danger, 
but only requires the elimination of dangers which 
the exercise of reasonable care would remove or 
guard against.'' 
It will be observed that Instruction No. 20 is dis-
associated with Instructions No. 9 and No. 10. Instruc-
tion No. 20 is in the exact language of defendant's 
Requested Instruction No. 4. How can it be argued 
in good common sense that such a p·resentation in 
negative fashion, contained in four separate instruc-
tions, is a compliance with the fundamental rule of 
law that each party is entitled to have his theory which 
is supported by the evidence presented to the j-q.ry in 
a clear and concise instruction~ 
The jury was told that the mere happening of the 
accident was no proof of negligence or evidence of 
same and that before plaintiff could recover the jury 
must find from a preponderance of evidence that the 
defendant was negligent as set forth in Instruction 
No. 9. The jury was not told that if they did find the 
facts to be as set forth in Instruction No. 9 they must 
find the issues in favor of plaintiff and against the de: 
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fendant. At no place in the entire set of instructions was 
the jury told that if the ties and area .around the ties, 
where plaintiff was required to locate himself in manipu-
lating the switch, had become and remained covered 
with snow and ice and slick .and slippery, and that such 
condition was a cause, in whole or in part, of plaintiff's 
injuries, they were under a duty to find the issues in 
favor of plaintiff. We submit that plaintiff's theory 
of recovery could not have been presented to the jury 
in any manner other than by apprising the jury in 
clear language of the duty defendant owed, and of the 
violation as applied to the facts, w~ich, if proved, would 
require a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. 
On the other hand, we invite the court's attention 
to instructions which contained defendant's theory of 
defense. The court, in Instruction No. 18 for example, 
· sets forth the duty plaintiff owed of exercising reason-
able care for his own safety; sets forth the conduct on 
the part of plaintiff, from which the jury could find 
plain tiff negligent and that if this negligence was the 
sole proximate eause of his injuries, the verdict should 
be ''No Cause of Action.'' Instruction No. 18 is herein 
set forth for the convenience of the court: 
"You are instructed that it is the duty of 
every employee to exercise reasonable care for his 
own safety. Therefore, if you believe from the 
evidence in this case that the plaintiff in manipu-
lating the switch which he was to turn failed to 
watch where he was about to step, and you further 
find that such f.ailure on his part was negligence 
as in these instructions defined, and if you further . 
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believe from the evidence that such negligence on 
his part was the sole proximate cause of plain-
tiff's injuries, then I instruct you that it is your 
duty to find the issue-s against the p·laintiff and 
in favor of the defendant and your verdict should 
be 'no cause of action'." 
Plaintiff's violation of duty and the mandate of 
"No Cause of Action" if such violation was the sole 
cause of his injuries, '""ere all clearly and succinctly set 
forth in one instruction. Is not plaintiff entitled to the 
same privilege~ Instructions bearing on defendant's 
various theories of defense are found at other places in 
the set of instructions and are herein set forth for 
the convenience of the court. 
"INSTRUCTION NO. 17 
''The court charges you that if you believe 
from the evidence that the injuries sustained 
by the plaintiff happened to him by a mere acci-
dent, or that the proximate cause of his injuries 
was due to his own negligence without negligence 
on the part of the defendant proximately con-
tributing to his injury, then your verdict must 
be for the defendant.'' 
''INSTRUCTION NO. 19 
''You are instructed that where an em'Ployee 
has two ways of performing an act in the course 
of his employment, the one safe and the other 
dangerous, the employee owes a duty to exercise 
reasonable and ordinary care to discover and 
use the safe way of performing such duty. There-
fore, if you find that the plaintiff could have 
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manipulated said switch while standing on cinders 
and gravel and tha,t such a position was reason-
ably safe and the plaintiff by the exercise of 
reasonable and ordinary care would have dis-
cover-ed such safe way of operating the switch, 
but nevertheless chose a position on the ties 
which he as a reasonable and prudent switchman 
should have known were slippery and danger-
ous, then the plaintiff would be guilty of negli-
gence, and if such negligence was the sole proxi-
mate cause of the 'Plaintiff's injury, then your 
verdict must be for the defendant, no cause for 
action.'' 
The following excerpts from instructions illustrate 
plaintiff's contention that defendant's various theories 
of defense were not only covered but were unduly, 
unnecessarily and erroneously emphasized to plaintiff's 
prejudice: 
"INSTRUCTION NO. 11 
"The jury is instructed that it cannot, in the 
performance of its duty as jurors,_ reach a verdict 
for the plaintiff in this case if, in order to do so, 
it is necessary to rest its verdict upon mere 
conjecture and speculation. * * * '' 
''INSTRUCTION NO. 12 
''The burden is upon the plaintiff to prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
defendant was negligent and that such negligence 
was a proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff. 
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To establish the defense of contributory negli-
gence the burden is upon the defendant to prove, 
by a preponderance of evidence, * * * " 
It will be noted that the court erroneously states 
that contributory negligence is a defense. The error in 
this instruction will be discussed under another heading. 
''INSTRUCTION NO. 15 
'' * * * it is the im•perative and sworn duty 
of the jury to hear and determine this case pre-
cisely the same as if it were between two indi-
viduals. In determining questions of fact you 
are not at liberty to indulge in speculation or 
conjecture not based on evidence introduced in 
the case, nor are you at liberty to follow your 
own ideas of what the law is or ought to be. 
* * • without reference to the individual or 
private character of the plaintiff or the public 
or corporate business or character of the defend-
ant * * * You should require as much eviden,ce 
to find an issue against a railroad company .as 
you would against an individual. A railroad 
company is entitled to the same protection of 
the law as .an individual. Sympathetic feelings 
have no place whatever in the trial of a case 
in a court of justice. You should disregard all 
such influence and determine the case at bar 
according to the law .and the· evidence given 
you in open court, regardless of who the parties 
are * * * '' 
' 
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The court erroneously uses the words ''the 
proximate cause'' in the instruction. There is no such 
thing .as ''the proximate cause'' under the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act. All factors contributing to 
an accident must, under that law, be considered and 
given due weight by the jury in reaching its verdict. 
''INSTRUCTION NO. 21 
"You are instructed t:P.at plaintiff must exer-
cise reasonable care for his own safety. There-
fore, if you believe from a preponderance of the 
evidence in this case that plain tiff's injury was 
caused by the negligence of the defendant, and 
if you further believe that the p~laintiff at the 
time and place in question failed to exercise that 
degree of care that the ordinary reasonably pru-
dent person would exercise under the same or 
similar circumstances, and, further, that such 
·failure o~ the part of the ~plaintiff proximately 
contributed to cause plaintiff's injury, then the 
plaintiff would not be entitled to recover full 
damages, but only a diminished sum * * * " 
"INSTRUCTION NO. 23. 
''The law does not permit you to_ guess or 
speculate as to the cause of the accident in ques- -
tion. If the evidence is equally balanced on the 
issue of negligence or proximate cause, so that 
it does not preponderate in favor of the party 
making the charge, then he has failed to fulfill 
his burden of p~roof * * * '' 
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The court does not disting~uish betw·een a guess or 
speculation and a permissible inference drawn from the 
evidence in the case. The instruction unduly emphasizes 
the burden resting on plaintiff and to a layman's mind 
\Yould indicate that from the ha~ppening of the accident 
itself one could not find neglig~ence unless he indulged 
in guessing or speculation when as a n1atter of legal 
principle a permissive inference could reasonably be 
deducted that the place of work was unsafe pecause 
slick and slippery and that the defendant was therefore 
negligent. This matter will also be discussed under 
another heading. 
We do not believe that the instructions regarding 
plaintiff's theory of liability when comp.ared with the . 
instructions containing defendant's theory of defense, 
can be read together without the conclusion being drawn 
that the court is in effect directing a verdict in favor of 
the defendant and against the plaintiff. This jurisdic~ 
tion has traditionally and without exception condemned 
the conduct of trial courts commenting upon the evi-
dence and injecting their own viewpoint as to the 
evidence or its weight or sufficiency upon the jury. 
The instructions 'pertaining to matters of defense 
are cited and discussed to point out the inequity and 
unfairness of the instructions as a whole, and also to 
emphasize plaintiff's contention that his theory of the 
case was not presented in an understandable manner 
to the jury. 
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Plaintiff made the following requests for instruc-
tions: 
''PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
IN·STRUCTION NO. 4 
"You are instructed that if you find from a 
preponderance of the evidence that defendant, 
by and through its authorized agents, servants 
and employees, knew, or in the exercise of ordi-
nary care should have known, that the weather 
was at freezing point and that water and snow 
around the switch where plaintiff was injured 
would be frozen and icy and would render that 
locality icy and slippery of footing and that de-
fendant failed and neglected to render such foot-
ing safe by cleaning the ice and snow off the 
place where switch tenders would in the ordinary 
performance of their duties be required to stand, 
or by sprinkling salt or sand in the area of said 
switch, and that such failure was negligence 
which ,proximately caused, in whole or in part, the 
injuries to plaintiff, then your verdict should be 
in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant 
and you should award plaintiff damages in ac-
cordance with the instructions herein contained." 
''PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 5 
"You ~are instructed that it is the duty of the 
railroad company to exercise reasonable care to 
provide its employees with a safe p·lace to work. 
This duty does not require the absolute elimina-
tion of all danger, but it does require the elimina-
tion of all dangers which. the exercise of reason-
able care by the railroad company would remove 
or guard against. 
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"In this connection you are instructed that if .. 
you find by a preponderance of the evidence that 
defendant failed to furnish plaintiff a reasonably 
safe place to work in that it allowed the area where 
;plaintiff "\Yas required to station himself to throw 
the S"\Yitch to become and remain covered with 
ice and snow rendering the footing of plaintiff 
and other employees using said switch insecure 
and unsafe, and if you further find by a ~pre­
ponderance of the evidence that said failure 
proximately caused, in whole or in part, the 
injuries to plaintiff, then you should return a 
verdict in favor of plaintiff and against defend-
ant and award damages to the plaintiff as in 
these instructions provided.'·' 
The requested instructions were supported by evi-
dence and by the law. 
The following cases hold fast to the proposition 
that each· party is entitled to have his theory of the 
case presented to the jury in a clear and understandable 
manner: 
In Furkovich v. Bingham Coal and Lumber Co., 45 
Utah 89, 143 P. 121, the Court stated: 
''A charge should be adapted to the facts and 
circumstances of the case on trial and not merely 
embody a correct abstract legal principle.'' 
Toone v. J. P .. O'Neill Const .. Co., (Jan. 16, 1912) 
40 Utah 265, 121 P. 10, 16. From judgment for the 
plaintiff defendant appeals. An action for personal 
injuries sustained while plaintiff was an employee of 
the defendant. While the court stated that the theory 
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of defendant was sufficiently covered by its instruction 
and affirmed the judgment, it nevertheless in regard 
to the duty of the trial court to instruct properly upon 
the theory of each party stated : 
''Without now passing upon the question 
whether the foregoing instruction was not too 
broad in view of the evidence, we concede that a 
party is entitled to have his case submitted to the 
jury upon the theory of his evidence as well as 
upon the theory of the whole evidence. One way 
the court might have followed in charging the jury 
would have been to charge them in separate in-
structions, first, in accordance with respondent's 
evidence; and, second, in accordance with appel-
lant's evidence which related to the proposition 
covered by the instruction in question, and in each 
instruction have directed the jury to return a 
verdict in accordance with their findings upon 
that question. The court was not bound to charge 
the jury in separate instructions, but could cover 
the question in one without offending against ap-
p~ellan t 's rights. ' ' 
Pratt v. Utah Light J; Traction ,Co .. , (Feb. 5, 1918) 
57 Utah 7, 169 P. 868, 869, 870. Action for personal in-
juries allege4 to ·have been sustained by plaintiff while 
~attempting to board a car of defendant company on 
Main Street in Salt Lake City. On judgment for plain-
tiff the defendant appeals. Defendant cited as error 
refus:al of the trial court to grant his instruction to the 
effect that ''if the jury find from the evidence that (plain-
tiff's injury was not caused by the starting from a posi-
tion of 'rest of the car of th~. defendant but was caused 
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by his acti.on in attempting to boar,d such car while the 
same was in motion, then the plaintiff would not be en-
titled to recover.'' The court, in reversing, stated: 
"Each party to a suit is entitled to have his 
theory, "'"hen there is evidence to sustain it, sub-
mitted to the jury and the judgment of the jury on 
the facts tending to support such theory, assum-
ing always that there is testimony offered to 
support the same, and this court has so held in 
Hartley v. Salt Lake City, 41, Utah, 121, 124 
Pac. 522, where, speaking through Straup, J., it 
is said: 
" 'There are two parties to a lawsuit. Each, 
on a submission of the case to the jury, is entitlep 
to a submission of it on his theory and the law 
in respect thereof. The defendant's theory as 
to the cause of the accident is embodied in the 
proposed requests. There is some evidence, as 
we have shown, to render them applicable to 
the case. That is not disputed. We think the 
court's refusal to charge substantially as re-
quested .was error. That the ruling was prejudi-
cial and works a reversal of the judgment is self-
evident and unavoidable.' · 
"To the same effect are the following authori-
ties: Knock v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 214 Mass. 
398, 101 N. E. 968; Chicago City· Ry. Co. v. H~a.rry 
C. Gates, 135 lll. Ap~p. 180; Patterson v. Electric 
Ry. Co., 26 App. Div. 336, 49 N. Y. Supp. 796; 
Kaukusch v. Ry. Co., 153 Ill. App. 454; Ander-
son v. Ry. Co., 36 App. Div. 309, 55 N. Y. Supp. 
290; Knoxville Traction Co. v. Carroll, 113 Tenn. 
514, 82 S. W. 313; Peck v. St. Louis Transit Co., 
178 Mo. 617, 77 s. -w. 736." 
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''Had the court given either of these instruc-
tions as requested or in substance and effect, we 
should be inclined to hold that the issue presented 
by the defendant's answer was sufficiently called 
to the ~attention of the jury, and its findings on 
that ~particular issue sufficiently determined. But, 
as indicated, there is nowhere in the instructions 
any direct or concrete statement instructing the 
jury that, if they found the facts as claimed by 
the defendant, the plaintiff would not be entitled 
to recover. This, in our judgment, should have 
been done. Where the issues are definite and 
direct, and testimony is offered in support of 
the different positions taken by the plaintiff and 
defendant, the court should, by unequivocal and 
unambiguous instructions, direct the jury's at-
tention to the issues of fact as thus presented 
to be determined by it, and there seems to be no 
good reason why such instructions should not 
have been given. Such, in our judgment, was 
not done by the court in its instructions in this 
case. The requests on the part of the defendant 
were seasonably made and were sufficient to 
direct the court's attention to the theory of the 
defendant's answer, and should have been given, 
if not in the words as submitted or requested, at 
least in substance and effect.'' 
Morgan v. Bingham Stage Lines Co. et al. (Dec. 
13, 1929), 283 P. 160, 166, 167. Action by plaintiff for 
the wrongful death of one Orson Morgan as a result of 
the alleged negligence of defendant in operation of one 
of its motor buses. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendants 
appeal. There was a conflict in the testimony as to 
whether or not the motor vehicle driven by defendant 
ran into plaintiff ·at a time when he was crossing the 
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street to n1ount a standing street car. Some of the testi-
. 
mony indicated that the street car was standing, some 
that it was moving ·a.t the time of the accident. There 
was evidence "~hich the court found authorized sub-
mission to the jury of the question of defendant's negli-
gence in failing to operate the vehicle at a proper and 
safe speed and in failing to keep a proper lookout. The 
court, in reversing and granting a new trial, discussed 
the obligation of the trial court to give instructions 
covering the theory of both parties to the case in the 
following language : 
''The court refused to give either of these 
requests, and the only instruction with reference 
to defendants' theory of contributory negligence 
in addition to instruction No. 5-, already quoted, 
was instruction No. 12, as follows: 
"'You are instructed that contributory 
negligence is the failure to use that ordinary 
care and diligence that would be expected of 
an ordinary prudent person of similar age 
and experience to that of the deceased, Orson 
Morgan, under like circumstances to avoid 
(an injury. Therefore,- even though you find 
that the defendants were negligent, still, if 
you find that the deceased, Orson Morgan, 
did not exercise that ordinary care and dili-
gence to prevent injury to himself that would 
be expected of ordinary and prudent persons 
of similar age and e~perience situated as 
Orson Morgan was, you should find for the 
defendants and against the plaintiff, no cause 
· of action.' -
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''A party is entitled to have his case submitted 
to the jury on the theory of his evidence as well 
as upon the theory of the whole evidence. Toone 
v. 0 'Neill Const. Co., 40 Utah, 265, 121 P. 10; 
Hartley v. Salt Lake City, 41 Utah, 121, 124 P. 
522, 523, :and Miller v. Utah Consol. M. Co. et al., 
53 Utah, 366, 178 P. 771; Pratt v. Utah Light & 
Traction Co., 57 Utah, 7, 169 P. 868. 
"The following language of Mr. Justice Straup 
in the case of Hartley v. Salt Lake City, supra, 
is pecularily applicable here: 'There are two par-
ties to :a lawsuit. Each, on a submis~sion of the 
case to the jury, is entitled to a submission of it 
on his theory and the law in respect thereof .. The 
defendant's theory as to the cause of the acci-
dent is embodied in the proposed requests. There 
is some evidence, as we have shown, to render· 
them applicable to the case. That is not disputed. 
We think the court ',s refusal to charge substan-
tially ia.s requested was error. That the ruling 
was ~prejudicial and works a reversal of the judg-
ment is self-evident and unavoidable.' 
''Respondent's counsel apparently do not con-
test this rule of law, but they argue these requests 
were substantially covered, as the court found 
was the ea.se in the cases cited. The court in 
other instructions set forth fully plaintiff's theory 
of the evidence as to the alleged negligence on the 
p~art of the defendants, but, except as pointed out, 
gave no instructions on defendants' theory. 
''While the requests are not models of accur-
acy, we think the defendants were entitled to have 
at least the substance of the s~ame given so as to 
present their theory of the evidence to the jury, 
and that a failure on the part of the court to do 
so was prejudicial error. 
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"By ""hat is here said it is not intended to 
hold that, in eYery case w· here a pedestrian at- . 
tempts to ~approach a street car, he must either 
stop or look or listen for a·pproaching vehicles 
and his failure to do so 'vould constitute con-
tributory negligence as a matter ·of law. All 
that it is intended to hold is that defendant is 
entitled to have his theory of the case presented 
to the jury. Briefly, they were entitled to have 
the jury told, in substance, that in crossing or 
attempting to cross a public street, it was the 
duty of the deceased to exercise due care and 
reasonable vigilance to discover approaching 
vehicles, and that, if the jury should find that as 
a matter of fact the deceased f,ailed to do what 
due care required by suddenly, without looking, 
-stepping out from the curb line between two 
parked cars directly into or in front of defend-
ants' car at a time and under such circumstances 
that defendants' agent could not, by the exercise 
of ordinary care, have avoided the accident they 
might find such conducf to be negligence on the 
part of the deceased, and, if they further found 
that such negligence_ directly contributed to the 
accident, then plaintiff could not recover." 
In Morrison v. Perry (Aug~ 17, 1943), 140 P. (2d) 
772, 778, the court stated : 
''Defendant's theory, which w·as supported by 
evidence, was that deceased, by driving on his 
left-hand side of the highway, and his failure to 
turn to his right side in time to avoid creating 
an emergency, did create an emergency which 
confronted defendant through no fault of his. The 
court failed to properly serp~arate the theories of 
the parties, but instead gave general instructions 
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treating the rights and duties of each d.river as 
being mutual, without regard to defenda;nt 's the-
ory as to deceased's negligence in first being on 
his w·rong side of the highway.. Defendant is en-
titled to have his case submitted to the jury on 
any theory justified by proper evidence. Morgan 
v. Bingham Stage Line Co., 75 Utah 87, 283 P. 
· 160; Hartley v. Salt Lake City, 41 Utah 121, 124 
P. 522; Pratt v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 57 
Utah 7, 169 P. 868; Smith v. Lenzi, 74 Utah 362, 
279 P. 893; Martineau v. Hanson, 47 Utah 549, 
155 P. 432. 
"Each party is entitled to have his theory of 
the case presented in such a way as to aid the 
jury and not confuse it. In Toone v. J.P. O'Neill 
Construction Company, 40 Utah 265, 121 P. 10, 
16, the Court suggests the better practice of pre-
senting the p·arties' theories of the case to the 
jury; 'One way the court might have followed 
in charging the jury would have been to charge 
them in separate instructions, first, in accordance 
with respondent's evidence; and, second, in ac-
cordance with appellant's evidence which related 
to the •proposition covered by the instruction in 
question, and in each instruction have directed 
the jury to return a verdict in accordance with 
their findings upon that question.' · 
''The court should have given some of the de-
fendant's requested instructions pertaining to 
his theory of the case. The defendant submitted 
49 requests for instructions, some of which were 
admittedly repetitious. Such a method of sub-
mitting requests for instructions does not aid 
the trial court in preparing the charge to the jury. 
We eall attention to the fact that defendant in 
his brief took time and effort to point out errors 
in instructions to which he took no exceptions.'' 
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The case of j_~IcDonald v. Unio·n Pacific R. Co., (Apr. 
5, 1946), 167 P. ( 2d) 685, 686, 'vas an action under the 
Federal Employers' Liability Act for damages caused 
by the alleged negligence of the defendant in failing to 
furnish pJ·aintiff a reasonably safe place to vvork. From 
judgment plaintiff appeals, citing as error the refusal 
of the trial court to grant instructions covering plain-
tiff's theory of the case. The appellate court found 
that the trial court had granted instructions covering 
plaintiff's theory of the case in other instructions. How-
ever, the court affirmed the general rule applicable 
in the following language : 
''Appellant has discussed his errors covering 
the lower court's refusal to give the requested 
instructions as a group. The substance of his 
objection is that, by such refusal,_ the lower court 
failed to submit to the jury appellant's theory 
of his case. There is no question that app·ellant 
is entitled to have his theory of the case submitted 
to the jury - that need not be argued. Pratt v. 
Utah Light & Traction Co., 57 Utah 7, 169 P. 
868; Morgan v. Bingham Stage Lines C·o., 75 
Utah 87, 283 P. 160. But did the court fail in 
this respect ~ '' 
All of the foregoing authorities support plaintiff's 
contention with respect to the court's refusal to grant 
and give ·plaintiff's Requests No. 4 and No. 5. Pl,aintiff 's 
Requested Instructions No. 4 and No. 5 are correct 
statements of the law as applied to the evidence in this 
case, in an affirmative manner ·setting forth plaintiff's 
theory of recovery. In all fairness plaintiff was en-
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titled to these instructions and at no other place in the 
instructions does plaintiff's theory of recovery appear. 
We feel certain that the grave miscarriage of justice 
demons'trated by the jury's verdict was caused, in part 
a.t least, by the error herein complained of and that 
therefore this error was grossly prejudicial to plaintiff. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERS-
IBLE ERROR AT THE SECOND TRIAL IN IN-
STRUCTION NO. 10 WHEN IT INSTRUCTED THE 
JURY THAT "* * * the mere happening of the acc·i-
dent to plaintiff is no P'roof of negligence on the part 
of either the plaintiff or defendant or evidence of same." 
(Statement of Points 4). 
By . this instruction all of the pertinent facts sup-
ported by, the testimony upon which plaintiff relied as 
establishing the negligence of defendant, and which 
stand uncontradicted, are withdrawn from jury con-
sideration. The happ~ening of the accident involved the 
fact that plaintiff slipped ·On the ice over the ties while 
engaged in the performance of his duties as a switch 
tender. The fact that he slipped was of important pro-
bative value in determining the ultimate question of 
whether or not his place of work was unsafe because 
slippery. The instruction of the court told the jury that 
the haippening of the accident, that is, plain tiff slipping 
on the ice over the ties, was rio evidence of negligence. 
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The happening of the accident \Yas the very essence of 
plaintiff's case. The law on this point is clearly de-
clared and stated in 38 Am. Jur. beginning at the top 
of ·page 985 in the following language: 
"While it is true that simply because an ac-
cident has occurred, negligence is not to be pre-
sumed, still, in determining the question of negli-
gence, the fact that an accident has occurred may 
be and should be taken into consideration, in con-
nection with all other facts and circumstances of 
the case, for the purpose of determining whether 
in fact there was negligence. Negligence may be 
inferred from circumstances surrounding the in-
jury, if not from the fact of the injury itself.'' 
In the footnote at page 985 of 38 American Juris-
prudence appears the following supported statement: 
''No general rule can be laid down that the 
mere occurrence- .of an accident is or is not suf-
ficient prima facie proof of actionable negligence. 
* * * Griffin v. Boston & A. R. Co., 148 Mass. 
143, 19 N. E. 166, 1 L.R.A. 698, 12 Am. St. Re·p. 
526. 
''Negligence, like any other fact, may be in-
ferred from th·e circumstances, ·and the case may 
be such that though there be no positive proof 
that the defendant has been guilty of any neglect 
of duty, the inference -of negligence would be ir-
resistible. Barnowsky v. Helson, 89 Mich. 523, 
50 N. W. 989, 15 L.R.A. 33. '' 
The Sup·reme Court -of Utah has without doubt 
recognized this fundamental and controlling proposition. 
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See Lewis v. Davis, 201 Pac. 861, 864, wherein the court 
stated: 
"At the close of plaintiffs' evidence defend-
ant moved for a nonsuit, and when all of the 
evidence was submitted moved for a directed 
verdict. Both motions were denied. Defendant 
excepted to both rulings of the court and argues 
the exceptions together. The grounds assigned 
for the motion are (1) Failure to prove defend-
ant's negligence at all; (2) failure to show that 
defendant permitted gas to leak; (3) the evi-
dence shows that deceased was guilty of con-
tributory negligence; ( 4) the injury, if caused 
by failure to properly care for the generator, 
was due to the negligence of fellow servants; 
( 5) the evidence fails to show the proximate 
cause of the injury ; ( 6) the deceased assumed 
the risk. The gist of defendant's contention in 
support of this .assignment seems to be that there 
is no definite proof of any specific act or omis-
sion on the part of defendant constituting negli-
gence which was the •proximate cause of the in-
jury. 
"It is true that no one saw the accident hap-
pen. No one knew just what Mr. Lewis was doing 
·when the explosion occurred. No one testified 
that the generator leaked gas, or that the hose 
was disconnected, thereby permitting gas to 
escape. No one saw water and carbide in the 
tank, or noticed the condition of the float. No 
one ·saw the generator so as to see whether it 
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had been taken apart, or whether the p·arts were 
in place, each performing its function in the gen-
eration of gas. No one knows the immediate cause 
of the explosion, or just how Mr. Lewis came 
to his death. 
''The above propositions, in substance, con-
stitute the basis upon which defendant relies in 
support of th·e contention that the court erred in 
denying its motion for nonsuit and directed ver-
dict. · 
' ' ( 2) In the opinion of the court, under the 
evidence in the record, the fact that an explosion 
actually occurred is an answer to practically 
every proposition abov·e set forth. If there had 
been no water and no carbide in the generator 
under pressure by means of a float on top and 
no gas leaking or hose disconnected by which 
gas could escape and no contact b·etween the gas 
and a lighted torch or other fire there could have 
been no explosion, and if there had been no ex-
plosion Robert Lewis would not have been killed 
in the manner shown by the evidence. ' ' 
Plaintiff charged defendant with neglect in failing 
to furnish him ·a safe place to work. The slipping and 
falling on the switch ties, under the authorities revealed 
here, was proper proof -of this allegation, yet this event 
and occurrence was removed from jury consideration 
by Instruction No. 10 given upon defendant's request. 
In the Lewis v. Davis case the happening of the accident 
and the facts surrounding it were found to he entirely 
sufficient to support the verdict of the jury favorable 
to the plaintiff. 
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The position of plaintiff is well stated in the case of 
Orris v. Chicago, R.I.&; P. Ry .. Co. (Mo.), 214 S.W.125, 
as: 
''I. The plaintiff says that there V\Tas error 
<:ommitted by the court in giving for defendant 
its instruction No. 1, which reads: 
" 'The court instructs you that the mere fact 
that plain tiff was injured while employed by de-
fendant, and the fact that he has sued to recover 
damages therefor, are of themselves no evidence 
"·hatever of the defendant's negligence or liability 
in this case, and there can be no recovery by the 
plain tiff in this case, unless the plaintiff has, by 
a preponderance of the credible evidence in the 
case, established negligence on the part of the de-
fendant, as described in other instructions herein.' 
'' \\T e think this instruction misleading and 
harmful in this case. Let us shorten the instruc--
tion so that its view may more fully appear. Thus 
shortened, it reads: 
'' ' The court instructs you that the mere 
fact that plaintiff was injured while employed 
by defendant * * * is of itself no evidence 
whatever of the defendant's negligence or lia-
bility in this case, and there can be no rec~ve~y 
by the plaintiff in this case unless th¥ pla1ntl~ 
has, by a preponderance of the cr~ed1table eVI-
dence in the case established negligence on the 
' 0 part of the defendant, as described in other In-
structions herein.' 
''From this instruction the jury could well 
dra~ ~he conclusion that they should not consid~r 
the InJury to plaintiff in determining the matter 
of defendal!-t 's n~egligence. They could well draw 
the conclus1on that they should not consider the 
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character of injury to plaintiff in determining the 
matter of defendant's negligence. They could 
"~en conclude that 'the creditable evidence' used 
in the latter part of the instruction meant evi-
dence other than evidence as to the injury and 
the character of the injury. In this particular 
case the character of the injury is a material link 
in the chain of circumstances tending to sho'v 
negligenee. To make the matter clearer some ad-
ditional facts in evidence should be stated. Thert-
is evidence tending to show that when the netting 
is in proper shape only small cinders escape 
through the smokestack, and that aft·er night 
they would look to be alive, and 'just a minute 
and they were out; they were fine cinders.' The 
evidence also shows that with some flues not 
working the suction through the others is greater, 
and this tends to throw the cinders out of the 
smokestack with more force and velocity. In ad-
dition the plaintiff says this particular cinder 
burned his eye, indicating heat and size. 
''So taking all the facts, the ·very character 
of the injury would be a link in the chain of cir-
cumstances tending to rprove a defective spark 
arrester, or negligence. The eye being burned in-
dicates heat in the cinder as well as size. The 
small cinders lose their heat more rapidly upon 
exposure to the air. The large cinder carries its 
heat or burning power longer arid further. So the 
character of the injury in a case like this tends 
to show a larger cinder, and a larger cinder 
tends to show a defective spark arrester. In 
eases like this the jury should consider the in-
jury and its character in an eff·ort to determine 
negligenee. This instruction, in our judgment, is 
misleading upon this matter. It is true that the 
mere fact of injury, standing alone, is no proof 
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of negligence. In Blanton v. Dold, 109 Mo. loc. cit. 
74, 18 S.W. 1151, this court said: 
'' 'The mere fact of an injury to plaintiff 
does not necessarily create a liability or war-
rant an inference of defendants' negligence. 
The burden of proof was on plaintiff to estab-
lish directly or by just inference, some want of 
care to which his injury might fairly and 
reasonably be traced.,. 
'' There is a line of cases to like effect. But 
these cases do not conflict with the views we have 
expressed in this case. These cases do not say 
that the character of the injury inflicted may not 
be a circumstance tending to show negligence, or 
a fact from which, when coup·led with other facts, 
negligence may not be inferred. 
''Instruction No. 1 says that the mere fact that 
'Plaintiff was injured is no evidence whatever of 
def.endan t 's negligence. This naturally led the 
jury to believe that they should not consider the 
injury in determining negligence in this case. We 
think the instruction wrong and so rule. The in-
struction, under the peculiar facts of this case, is 
but little better than the instruction so forcefully 
condemned by Brown, C., in Myers v. City of 
Independence, 189 S. W. loc. cit. 823. After set-
ting out the instruction, our learned commissioner 
commented thus: 
'' 'This instruction illustrates that masterly 
use of language by which even experts are 
puzzled, and juries wait with patience for such 
explanation as their author can give of the 
meaning of the terms he has used. It tells them 
that unless he has proven his case by the greater 
weight of the testimony they must disregard 
the fact that he received injuries. In a case in 
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\Yhich, uccurd.iug to all authority, the fact that 
he received injuries cuts so large an evidential 
figure, it is important that the jury should be 
plainly instructed whether he must prove his , 
case by the greater weight of evidence before 
the jury could take into consideration the fact 
that he was injured, or whether the fact that he 
" ... as injured by the turning of the current of 
electricity through his body might he taken 
into consideration in proving 'his case' is not 
explained. A careful reading of this instruc-
tion impresses us that the words we have itali-
cized have no logical or grammatical office in 
it, other than that which lies in the W ebsterian 
definition of the word 'injury' as 'an act which 
damages, harms, or hurts,' or its legal defini-
tion, 'an actionable wrong.' In a case of this 
character, where so much depends upon the de-
duction of fact to be drawn from the occurrence 
of the injury, the vice of such an instruction is 
especially manifest.' 
''So we say of this instruction. It is mislead-
ing to the utmost. From it the jury could readily 
conclude that in determining negligence or liabil-
ity they should entirely exclude the injury and its 
peculiar character. 
"In Walker v. Railroad, 178 S. W. loc. cit. 
109, we had before us this instruction: 
'' 'The mere fact, if it be a fact, that plain-
tiff was injured does not entitle her to recover 
in this case, and you should not allow such fact 
to influence you in arriving at your verdict.' 
"In that case, like this, the jury had found 
for the defendant. The foregoing instruction had 
been given for the defendant. Of this instruction 
we said: - .-
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'' 'The court instructed the jury at the in-
stance of defendant that they should not allow 
the fact that the plaintiff was injured to influ-
ence them in arriving at their verdict. While 
we understand that the fact of injury is not 
alone sufficient to authorize a recovery on the 
ground of negligence, we do not understand 
how it is possible for the jury to remain unin-
fluenced by the existence of a fact the existence 
or nonexistence of which is the ultimate subject 
of their inquiry. The fact that plaintiff was per-
mitted to fall to the ground is the negligence 
charged. Negligence is predicated upon the 
fact, which the jury must find, that the fall is 
liable to injure her, and they must also find 
that the injury was the immediate result of 
letting her fall. There is a refinement some-
where in this instruction which we are unable 
to grasp, and we think that is sufficient reason 
for withholding the task from the jury.' 
''So we say in this case. The task of grasping 
defendant's instruction No. 1 should have been 
withheld from the jury.'' 
In Southern Ry. Co. v. Smith (Ala.), 221 Ala. 273, 
128 S. 228, 230, the trial court refused to give the follow-
ing instructions requested by the defendant: 
"7. 'The court charges the jury that the fact, 
if it be a fact, that the plaintiff was thrown or 
caused to fall by the sudden movement or jerking 
of the cars is not evidence of negligence.,. 
· '' 8. 'The court charges the jury that the mere 
fact that the p~laintiff was thrown or caused to 
fall from the cars to the ground and sustained 
the injuries complained of, is not sufficient to 
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authorize the jury to find that the defendant's 
engineer was guilty of any negligence proximately 
causing the iJ>laintiff's injuries.' '' 
The Appellate Court held that these requests were 
properly refused, and stated: 
''We do not think the particular attitude of 
plaintiff on top of the car, as a matter of law, 
prevents an application of the rule there stated, 
that the fact that he fell off the train, in conse--
quence of a jerk, is some evidence that the jerk 
was unusually or negligently severe, unless the 
jury should find that his attitude was such as that 
an ordinarily careful jerk would have caused him 
to fall as he did. In view of the fact that the 
jury could find that an ordinary jerk would not 
have caused plaintiff thus to fall, we cannot say 
as a matter of law in this case that a fall caused 
by the jerk was not some evidence of negligence. 
To say so would invade the province of the jury. 
It will be observed that, the jury was not in-
structed that in this case the fall, occasioned by 
a jerk, was some evidence that it was unusual or 
negligent. That would likewise have been inva-
sive of the province of the jury as applied to the 
facts and contentions in this case.'' 
The error herein complained of becomes more mani-
fest when viewed in relation to the Court's Instruction 
No. 11, herein set forth : 
''The jury is instructed that it cannot, in the 
performance of its duty as jurors, reach a verdict 
for the p·laintiff in this case if, in order to do so, 
it is necessary to rest its verdict upon mere con-
jecture and speculation. Before finding a verdict 
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for the ~plaintiff the jury must believe, from a 
preponderance of the evidence and as a fair in-
ference from the evidence adduced, that the 
plain tiff was injured by reason of the alleged act 
of negligence set forth in Instruction No. 9 and 
heretofore mentioned.'' 
By Instructions Nos. 10 and 11 the jury was told that 
the mere happening of the accide~t was no proof of 
n·egligence nor evidence of same and that they could not 
base a finding upon mere conjecture and speculation. 
No distinction was made between . mere conjecture and 
speculation, and permissible inferences allowable from 
the £act plain tiff slip.ped and was injured. 
In Lavender v. K urn, et al., 327 U.S. 645, 66 S. Ct. 
740, 743, the Supreme Court of the United States de-
clared: 
-''It is no answer to say that the jury's verdict 
involved speculation and conjecture. Whenever 
facts are in dispute or the evidence is such that 
fair-minded men may draw different inferences, 
a measure of speculation and conjecture is re-
quired on the part of those whose duty it is to 
settle the dispute by choosing what seems to them 
to be the most reasonable inference. Only when 
there is a complete absence of probative facts to 
support the conclusion reached does a reversible 
error appear. But where, as here, there is an 
·evidentiary basis for the jury's verdict, the jury 
is free to discard or disbelieve whatever facts 
are inconsistent with its conclusion. And the ap-
iJ>·ellate court's function is exhausted when that 
evidentiary basis becomes apparent, it being im-
material that the court might draw a contrary 
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inference or feel that another conclusion is more 
reasonable. '' 
In the case at bar the fact that an accident occurred 
was a most important fact in the determination of 
whether or not defendant was negligent. The event 
consisted of Williams slipping on the switch ties. From 
the fact that he slipped, the permissible inference could 
be drawn that there was a slipp;ery, unsafe condition 
which caused him to fall, and the consideration of that 
factor, together with the other circumstances in the 
case, might well have led a properly instructed jury 
to conclude that negligence existed. But the jury was 
not permitted to consider Williams' slipping in reaching 
its determination of the'" existence or nonexistence of 
negligence nor to draw any inferences therefrom. Such 
limitation on the jury deprived plaintiff of substantial 
rights. That this error occurred in an instruction which. 
the court intended as the inst.ruction containing (Plaintiff's 
theory of the case makes the error much more manifest. 
In other words, the jury is directed to Instruction No. 10 
as containing plaintiff's theory of the case and in that 
instruction is confronted with the erroneous legal prin;_ 
ciple that the mere happening of the accident is no proof 
of negligence on the p.art of defendant or evidence of 
same. 
We submit that the gross error contained in Instruc-
tion No. 10 was most prejudicial, and in and of itself 
requires reversal. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
56 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT, AT THE SECOND TRIAL, 
BY GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 12., HAS REVIVED 
THE DOCTRINE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE AS A COMPLETE BAR TO RECOVERY BY 
PLAINTIFF (Statement of Points 6). 
Instruction No. 12 is herein set forth for the con-
venience of the court : 
''The burden is upon the plaintiff to prove by 
a preponderance of the evidence that the defend-
ant was negligent and that such negligence was a 
proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff. To 
establish the defense of ·contributory negligence 
the burden is upon the defendant to prove, by a 
preponderance of evidence, that the ·plaintiff was 
negligent and that such negligence contributed in 
some degree as a proximate cause of the injury.'' 
(R. 064). 
It is readily apparent from a cursory reading 
of the instruction that the trial court misconceived the 
roll of contributory negligence under the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act. Where the concept of multiplicity 
of causes and apportionment of damages is recognized, 
contributory negligence can never he considered as a 
defense. Webster's Dictionary defines defense -as, ''An 
opposing or denial of the truth or validity of the plain-
tiff's case.'' Contributory negligence is only material 
as bearing on the issue of damages. 
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45 United States Code ..:lnnotated, Section 53, reads 
as follows: 
''In all actions hereafter brought against any 
such comn1on carrier by railroad under or by 
virtue of any of the ·provisions of this chapter to 
recover damages for personal injuries to an em-
ployee, or where such injuries have resulted in 
his death, the fact that the employee may have 
been guilty of contributory negligence shall not 
bar a recovery, but the damages .shall be diminish-
ed by the jury in proportion to the amount of 
neglig·ence attributable to such employee: P~Q­
vided, That no such employee who may be injured 
or killed shall be held to have been guilty of con-
tributory negligence in any case where the viola-
tion by such common carrier of any statute en-
acted for the safety of employees contributed to 
the injury or death of such employee.'' 
Instruction No. 12 is a stock instruction applicable 
to common law negligence actions but wholly erroneous 
in an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. 
Instruction No. 21, which pertains to assessment of 
damages, does not correct the error contained in In-
struction No. 12. 
In 64 C. J., Sec. 600, it is stated: 
"It is proper to refuse, and error to give con-
flicting and contradictory instructions, since a 
charge containing two distinct propositions con-
flicting with each other tends so to confuse the 
jury as to prevent their rendition of an intelligent 
verdict, the jury cannot be required to determine 
what part of a contradictory charge is correct, 
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or left to reconcile conflicting ·principles of law; 
it ordinarily cannot be determined from the ver-
dict which rule was adopted by the jury, the court 
is left in doubt and uncertainty as to the facts 
actually found by the jury as a basis for its ver-
dict, and where instructions are inconsistent with, 
or contradict, each other, it is usually impossible 
to say whether the jury were controlled by the 
one or the other.'' 
Courts have held under many and varied circum-
stances that giving of conflicting instructions constitutes 
reversible error. 
In Atlantic Co. et al. v. Roberts, 179 Va. 669, 20 S. E. 
2d 520, it appeared that the fact situation warranted an 
instruction on unavoidable accident. One of the instruc-
tions was to the ·effect that if ·plaintiff was free fron1 
fault the jury could find the issues in favor of plaintiff 
and against the defendant. The court held that the 
giving of the instruction under the facts of this particular 
case without qualifying it by setting forth the unavoid-
able accident situation was reversible error. The Court 
stated: 
''Instruction No. 3 is erroneous in that it 
makes no reference to an unavoidable accident, 
but would allow recovery if the jury simply 
found the plaintiff free of fault. This instruction 
is thus in conflict with and vitiates instruction 
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'G', given on behalf of the defendants, which is 
in the follo\Ying language : 
" 'The court instructs the jury that if you 
believe from the evidence that the plaintiff was 
injured ~s a result of an unavoidable accident, 
then your verdict must be for the· defendant.' '' 
In Kuether v. Kansas City Light & Power Co. (Mo.), 
276 S. ''1• 105, 109, the court held that instructing the 
jury in a situation where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
·was properly applicable that they had no right to pre-
sume negligence if the evidence did not preponderate 
in favor of the plaintiff, would have been reversible 
error. The Court stated: 
''Defendant directs anothe-r charge of error 
against the action of the court in refusing defend-
ant's proffered instruction D5, where it was 
sought to tell the jury that they have 'no right to 
presume negligence, and, if the evidence does not 
i)reponderate in favor of plaintiff, then your ver-
dict should be for the defendant.' This is con-
tradictory of, and in conflict with, plaintiff's in-
structions 1 and 2, which we hoi~ properly in-
cluded the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The 
instruction of defendant was prop~erly refused.'' 
See also Oettinger v. Stewart (Cal. 1943), 137 P. 2d 852. 
In Thomas v., Stott (Mo.), 114 S. W. 2d 142, 144, the 
court found that there was a fact situation in which the 
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jury could find that plaintiff's negligence was the sole 
negligence in the case and held that instructing the jury 
that contributory negligence does not defeat recovery 
under the humanitarian doctrine without also instructing 
that the sole negligence of the plaintiff would defeat re-
covery was error. The Court stated: 
"While contributory negligence does not de-
feat recovery under the humanitarian doctrine, 
still the doctrine is now well established that sole 
negligence of plaintiff may defeat recovery. It 
follows that if there be substantial evidence that 
a plaintiff's injury be caused by plaintiff's sole 
negligence, then defendant is entitled to an in-
struction submitting the question of sole negli-
gence of plaintiff. Borgestede v. W aldbauer, 337 
Mo. 1205, 88 S. W. 2d 373. We conclude that the 
evidence given by the defendant in this case jus-
tifies the giving of instruction F. 
''As to instruction No. 1, the same conforms 
in substance to instructions that have been ap-
proved. However, as the question of sole negli-
gence is involved in this case, we conclude that 
the instruction presents reversible error in that 
it permits the jury to find for ·plaintiff regard-
less of the fact of whether or not her negligence 
was the sole cause of her injury. Instruction No. 
1, we conclude, is in error, also, for the reason 
that it is in conflict with a proper instruction 
given on behalf of defendant." 
Other cases where it has been held that instructions 
were conflicting and therefore prejudicial are hereil1 
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cited for the convenience of the court: W estbe.rg v. 
Willde (Cal.), 85 P. 2d 507; Morrison v. Perry (Utah), 
(1943), 140 P. 2d 772; Alcamisi v. Market St. Ry .. Co., 67 
Cal. App. 710, 228 P. 410; Hageman v. Arnold (Mont.), 
254 P. 1070; Skelton v .. Great Northern Ry. Co., (Mont.), 
100 P. 2d 929. 
We recognize the doctrine that the instructions as 
given by the court are to be considered and read as a 
whole. However, w·here two instructions are apparently 
conflicting and are not related one to the other by ref-
erence, as in the ease at bar, it can never be determined 
which instruction was followed by the jury, and although 
one of said instructions is correct, that in no way ex-
cuses the error contained in the other. Here the jury 
is referred to ''the defense of contributory negligence,'' 
and that if the palintiff was negligent and such negli-
gence contributed as a- cause of his injures the defense 
of contributory negligence is available to the defendant> 
Such instruction in a Federal Employers' Liability Act 
case is confusing and misleading especially where at no 
place in the instructions is the jury told that contributory 
negligence is not a defense, but can only be considered 
in mitigation of damages. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT, AT THE SECOND TRIAL, 
BY GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 19, PLACED AN 
UNWARRANTED BURDEN OF PROOF UPON TH:BJ 
SHOULDERS OF PLAINTIFF AND IN EFFECT 
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REVIVED THE DOCTRINES OF CONTRIBUTORY 
NEGLIGENCE AND ASSUMPTION OF RISK AS 
COMPLETE BARS TO RECOVERY BY PLAINTIFF 
(Statement of Points 7). 
For convenience of the court, Instruction No. 19 is 
set forth herein : 
''INSTRUCTION NO. 19 
''You are instructed that where an employee 
has two ways of performing an act in the course 
of his employment, the one safe and the other 
dangerous, the employee owes a duty to exercise 
reasonable and ordinary care to discover and use 
the safe way of performing such duty. Therefore, 
if you find that the plaintiff could have manipu-
lated said switch while standing on cinders and 
gravel and that such a position was reasonably 
safe and the plaintiff by the exercise of reasonable 
and ordinary care would have discovered such 
safe way of operating the switch, but nevertheless 
chose a position on the ties which he as a reason-
able and prudent switchman should have known 
were slippery :and dangerous, then the plaintiff 
would be guilty of negligence, an·d if such negli-
gence was the sole proximate cause of the plain-
tiff's injury, then your verdict must be for the 
defendant, no cause for action.-'' 
The character of the duty which plaintiff owed is 
clearly confused in Instruction No. 19. Plaintiff owed no 
duty of exercising reasonable and ordinary care to dis-
cover and use a safe way of throwing the switch even 
assuming that there was a safe and a dangerous waJJ 
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available to h.-im. He simply owed the duty of conducting 
hinl,Self as a reasonably prudent pe.rson under the cir-
cumstances. If he negligently cho·se a dangerous way 
when a safe way 'vere available to him, that could amount 
to nothing more than contributory negligence on his 
part and the question remaining for the jury's considera-
tion is whether or not the place was unsafe and whether 
or not the railroad company neglected its duty in failing 
to furnish him with a reasonably safe place in which to 
work. The duty imposed upon plaintiff by the instruction 
was therefore a greater and different duty than that 
imposed by the Federal Employ~rs' Liability Act. 
In Boston & M.R.R. v. Cabana, 148 F. 2d 150, 152, 
the court stated : 
"The defendant contends that it was under 
no duty to light the area near the door at the 
back of the engine house where the p·laintiff's 
work did not require him to go. Such an argument 
may prove too much since if the plaintiff had 
been working near the rear wheels the short 
route to the other side would have been the one 
he actually followed. On the facts here, however, 
he took the longer way around, and the reason-
ableness of that is for the jury. At the most it 
has to do with contributory negligence on his· 
part, and under the Act contributory negligence 
is not a defense and goes merely to the mitiga-
tion of damages.'' 
We conceive the correct rule of law to be set forth 
in Brady v .. Flo.rence & C. 'C. R. Co., 44 Colo. 283, 98 P. 
321, 323, wherein it is stated that even though one manner 
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of performing a task h; n1ore dangerous than another, 
the plaintiff is not guilty of neglect in choosing the 
more dangerous method if in doing so he does not di ~­
obey instructions or rules, acts in good faith and the 
method chosen might have been adopted under like 
circumstances by a reasonable and prudent man. We 
quote from the case as follows: 
'' * * * But it is insisted that Brady was negli-
gent in regard to the method employed by him 
for performing this duty. Such negligence con-
sisting in uncoupling the air brake from the in-
side, instead of from the outside of the curve 
upon which train No. 37 was standing. In other 
words, that Brady chose the more dangerous of 
two methods for performing his duty, and hence 
assumed all the risk involved in so doing. Touch-
ing the ·proposition of law thus invoked, we sug-
gest in passing that the choice does not establish 
contributory negligence, if in so doing he does 
not disobey instructions or rules, acts in good 
faith, and the method chosen might have been 
adopted under like circumstances by a reason-
able and prudent man.'' 
And in the recent case of Wilkerson v. Mc~Carthy et 
al., 336 U. S. 53, 69 S. Ct. 413, 417, reversing the Utah 
Supreme Court 187 P. 2d 188, t,he United States Supreme 
Court supported the proposition herein contended for in 
the following language: 
.. 
''There was, as the state court pointed out, 
evidence to show that p~etitioner could have taken 
a slightly longer route and walked around the 
pit, thus avoiding the use of the board. This 
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fact, ho\Yever, under the ter1ns of the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act, would not completely 
immunize the respondents from liability if the 
injury was 'in part' the result of respondents' 
negligence. For while petitioner's failure to use 
a safer method of crossing might be found by the 
jury to be contributory negligence, the Act pro-
vides that 'contributory negligence shall not bar 
a recovery, but the damages shall he diminished 
by the jury in proportion to the amount of negli-
gence attributable to such employee * * *.' '' 
It will be noted that the court places the burden on 
plaintiff of discovering at his peril, the safer or less 
dangerous of two available "\vays of ·performing a duty·. 
That duty has never been pronounced as an affirmative 
duty on the part of plaintiff. Plaintiff's only duty is 
to exercise that degree of care of an ordinary prudent 
person under the circumstances. If plaintiff w·ere negli-
gent under the evidence in this case he could have only 
been negligent because he failed to discover a more 
safe way available to him. There is absolutely no evi-
dence from which a jury could find that plaintiff at any 
time actually discovered the unsafe condition which re-
sulted in his injury. It was dark, and he was in a hurry. 
He said he did not know the switch ties were slick and 
slippery until he slip.ped and fell. If the jury, under the 
court's instruction, found that plaintiff was negligent in 
failing to discover a safe way of performing his work, 
they were invited by the court's instruction to find also 
that this failure was the sole proximate cause of plain-
tiff's injury. Plaintiff could only be negligent if the 
place he chose for working was unsafe. If the place of 
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work was unsafe the defendant must, under the law, 
be charged with violation of its duty toward plaintiff, 
and if the jury is invited under those circumstances to 
find that plaintiff's negligence was the sole proximate 
cause of his injury, the court ~s reviving the doctrine of 
assumption of risk and is saying to the jury, ''If plain-
tiff should have discovered the unsafe place of work 
but didn't, and is injured thereby, he assumed the risks 
associated with the unsafe condition.'' Our Federal Con-
gress has eliminated the defense of assumption of risk 
in the following language, 45 U.s:. C. A.., Section 54: 
''Section 54. Assumption of risks of employment. 
''That in any action brought against any com-
mon carrier under or by virtue of any of the 
provisions of this chapter to recover damages 
for injuries to, or the death of, any of its em-
ployees, such employees shall not be held to have 
assumed the risks of his employment in any case 
where such injury or death resulted in whole or 
in part from the negligence of any of the officers, 
agents, or employees of such carrier; and no 
employee shall be held to have assumed the risks 
of his employment in any case where the viola-
tion by such common carrier of any statute en-
acted for the safety of employees contributed to 
the injury or death of such employee. Apr. 22, 
1908, c. 149, Sec. 4, 35 Stat. 66; Aug. 11, 1939, 
c. 685, Sec. 1, 53 Stat. 1404." 
In the case of Tille.r v .. Atlantic ·Coast Line R. Co., 
318 U.S. 54, 87 L. Ed. 610, 63 S.·Ct. 444, 446, it appeared 
that a railroad policeman was inspecting seals on cars of 
j j' 
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a train moving slo,vly on one track 'vhen he 'Yas killed 
by the rear car of a train backing in an opposite dire c-
. · tion on another track. The rear of the train which killed 
the policeman 'vas unlighted, although a brakeman with 
a lantern 'vas riding on the back step on the side away 
from the ·policeman and the bell was ringing on the 
engine but no special signal of warning was given. The 
trial court granted a directed verdict against plaintiff 
which was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, 
{128 F ... (2d)420), whereupon plaintiff was granted a writ 
of certiorari by the Supreme Court of the United States 
and the case was reversed, the court holding that ques-
tions of negligence and contributory negligence should 
have been submitted to the jury. The negligence claimed 
by plaintiff was in failure of the defendant to furnish 
plaintiff a reasonably safe place to work. The court 
stated: 
''The Circuit Court distinguished he tween 
assumption of risk as a defense by employers 
against the consequence of their own negligence, 
and assumption of risk as negating any conclu-
sion that negligence existed at all. The court 
reasoned that if, for example, the respondent had 
negligently failed to provide a workman with a 
sound tool, and he was thereby injured, it could 
not under the amendment claim that he had 
assumed the risk of using the defective imp.Iement; 
but that if a workman were injured in the ordi-
nary course of his work, as in such a switching 
operation as this, the assumption of risk might still 
be relied upon to prove that the resipondent had 
no duty to protect him from accustomed danger. 
The court rejected petitioner's argument that 
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since the doctrine of assumption of risk had been 
abolished 'the carrier can no longer interpose it 
as a shield against the consequences of its neglect 
and hence is liable for injuries to its employees 
in its railroad yards or elsewhere, unless it takes 
precautions for their safety commensurate with 
the danger that they are likely to encounter.' 
In rejecting this argument the court below put 
the core of its decision in these words: 'The con-
·clusion is inescapable that Congress did not intend 
to enlarge the obligation of carriers to look out 
for the safety of their men when exposed to the 
ordinary risks of the business, and that in circum-
stances other than those provided for in the 
amended section of the statute, the doctrine of 
the assumption of the risk must be given its 
accustomed weight.' 
''We find it unnecessary to consider whether 
there is any merit in such a conceptual distinc-
tion between asipects of assumption of risk which 
seem functionally so identical, and hence we need 
not pause over the cases cited by the court below, 
all decided before the 1939 amendment, which 
treat assumption of risk sometimes as a defense 
to negligence, sometimes as the equivalent to 
non-negligence. We hold that every vestige of 
the doctrine of assumption of risk was obliterated 
from the law by the 1939 amendment, and that 
Congre.ss, by abolishing the defense of assumption 
of risk in that statute, did not mean to leave 
op,en the identical defense for the master by 
changing its name to 'non-negligence'. As this 
Court said in facing the ·hazy margin between 
negligence and assumption of risk as involved 
in the Safety Appliance Act of 1893, 45 U.S.C.A. 
Sec. 1 et seq., 'Unless great care be taken, the 
servant's rights will be sacrificed by simply 
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charging him with assumption of the risk under 
another name ; ' and no such result can be per-
mitted here. 
"Perhaps the nature of the present ·problem 
can best be seen against the background of one 
hundred years of master-servant tort doctrine. 
Assumption of risk is a judicially created rule 
which was developed in response to the general 
impulse of common law courts at the beginning 
of this period to insulate the employer as much 
as possible from bearing the 'human overhead' 
which is an inevitable part of the cost-to someone 
-of the doing of industrialized business. The 
general purpose behind this development in the 
common law seems to have been to give maximum 
freedom to expanding industry. The assumption 
of risk doctrine for example was attributed by 
this Court to 'a rule of public policy, inasmuch 
as an opposite doctrine would not only subject 
employers to considerable and often ruinous re-
sponsibilities, thereby embarrassing all branches 
of business,' but would also encourage careless-
ness on the part of the employee. In the pursuit 
of its general objective the common law took many 
forms and developed many doctrines. One ~of the 
first was the fellow serv&nt-assumption of risk 
rule which originated in Priestly v. Fowler. In 
Priestly v. Fowler, the Court said, 'The servant 
is not bound to risk his safety in the service of 
his master, and may, if he thinks fit, decline any 
service in which he reasonably apprehends injury 
to himself: and in most of the cases in which 
danger may be incurred, if not in all, he is just 
as likely to be acquainted with the probability 
and extent of it as the master.' 
''As English courts lived with the assumption 
of risk doctrine they discovered that the theory 
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they had created -had become morally unaccept-
able but of such legal force that it could not be 
repudiated. The English sought to eliminate the 
fellow servant rule, which placed the burden of 
an employee's negligence as it affected another 
employee on the injured person rather than o~ the 
business enterprise, by the employers' Liability 
Act of 1880 and found that the assumption of risk 
doctrine still left the employee in a hopelessly 
unprotected position. In the leading case of 
Thomas v. Quartermaine, 1887, 18 Q.B.D. 685, the 
court held that an employee standing on a three 
foot runway between two unfenced vats who was 
attempting to dislodge a piece of wood from one 
of the vats and who by accident fell into the other 
and was scalded was barred from recovery. Since 
he had long known of the possible dangers of the 
narrow p1assage he w:as held to _hav-e assumed the 
risk of his position. In 1897 the English finally 
abandoned the common law remedy altogether as 
a protection for injured employees and adopted 
a workman's compensation law. '60 & Viet. c. 37." 
It is observed that in the old English case, cited by 
the court, it was held that since plaintiff had long known 
of the possible dangers of the narrow passage he as-
sumed the risk of his position. That was the typical 
case of assumption of risk which the court held that the 
1939 amendment was designed to forever erase from the 
law as it pertains to railroad employee'S under the F.E. 
L.A. The court said : 
''The doctrine of assump~tion of risk cannot 
be 'abolished in toto' and still remain in partial 
existence as the court below suggests. The theory 
that a servant is completely barred from recovery 
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for injury re·sulting from his master's negligence, 
which legislatu.res have sought to eliminate in all 
·its variou,s forms of contributory negligence, the 
fellow servant rule, and assumption of risk, must 
not, contrary to the will of Congress, be allowed 
recrudescence under any other label in the com-
mon law lexieon • • *. '' 
This court disregarded the Tiller case and in effect 
accepted the old Thomas v. Quartermaine case and the 
doctrine of assumption of risk as its authority, when 
it invited the jury to find that the place where plaintiff 
was working was unsafe and at the same time to find 
that plaintiff's failure to discover that unsafe condition _ 
was the sole proximate cause of his injuries. 
The sole question which was of importance to this 
jury was whether the place where plaintiff was injured 
was a place for men to -work and whether the unsafe 
condition contributed, in whole or in part, to the injuries 
he sustained. 
It will be noted that throughout the instructions 
the jury, under given circumstances, are invited to find 
that contributory negligence on the part of ·plaintiff was 
the sole ·proximate cause of his injuries. Instruction No. 
17 states: 
'' * * * or that the proximate cause of his in-
juries was due to his own negligence without 
negligence on the part of the defendant proxi-
mately contributing to his injury, then your ver-
dict must be for the defendant.'' 
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Instruction No. 18 also contains the same proposition: 
'' * * * if you further believe from the evidence 
that such negligence on his part was the sole 
proximate cause of ~plaintiff's injuries, then * * * 
it is your duty to find the issues against the 
plaintiff * * * '' 
In Instruction No. 19 the same proposition appears. 
'' * * * then the plaintiff would be guilty or 
negligence, and if such negligence was the sole 
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, then 
your verdict must be for the defendant, * * * '' 
Permeating the whole of the instructions is the er-
roneous proposition that the jury could at one and the 
same time find plaintiff guilty of negligence in failing to 
discover an unsafe place to work, and also that such 
negligence was the sole proximate cause of his injury. 
This constitutes revival, in full regalia, of the ancient 
and yicious doctrine of assumption of risk which our 
Federal Congress has endeavored to eradicate from the 
field of F.E.L.A. law. 
POINT VI 
THE JURY'S VERDICT IS CONTRARY TO IM-
PORTANT UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE PRE-
SENTED AT THE TRIAL. 
Plaintiff's right of recovery is based upon the 
Federal Employers' Liability Act, which affords remedy 
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in all cases 'vhere the injury of an employee is caused, 
either in whole or in part, by negligence of the carrier. 
The specific act of neg~ligence relied on by the plain tiff is 
that defendant, by and through its authorized agents, 
servants and employees, knew, or in the .exercise of or-
dinary care should have known, that the 'veather was at 
freezing point and that slush and sno\v around the 
switch where plaintiff was injured would be frozen and 
would render footing dangerous and unsafe and that 
defendant failed and neglected to make said footing 
reasonably safe by cleaning the ice and snow off the 
place where switch tenders would, in the ordinary per-
formance of their duties, be required to stand, move 
or walk, and that said negligent conduct proximately 
caused, in whole or in part, the injuries to plaintiff. 
The uncontroverted evidence p·resented at the trial 
is that plaintiff was injured at approximately 7:10 a.ni. 
on the 9th day of December, 1946. The last precipitation 
in the area where the accident occurred had ended at ap--
proximately 12 :45 p.m. on the 8th day of December, 
1946. This precipitation consisted of snow and sleet.. 
It was Sunday and the precipitation was heavy enough 
that workmen were called out specially to clean switch 
points and areas around switch stands and had worked 
from noon until 6 p.m. on the 8th day of Deeember, 1946; 
the temperature had gone down to freezing. Thereafter, 
during the course -of the night, it had hovered near freez-
ing. Plaintiff was injured while it was still dark. Work-
men were still required to use their lanterns in the per-
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formance of their duties. The plaintiff ha~ only been 
working ten minutes. During that time he had been ex-
ceedingly busy, having thrown four switches. A ·pas-
senger train was standing on the westbound track wait-
ing until he had thrown the switch where he was in-
jured. He was working against time. All of these facts 
were uncontroverted by any evidence in the case. 
Also uncontroverted was the fact that ice covered 
the switch ties at the switch where he was injured and 
that i.ce and snow covered the area around the switch-
stand. The photographs taken by- defendant's employ-
ees at 9 o'clock on the morning of the 9th prove with-
out ·any possibil~ty of conflict or controversy that the 
condition of the area where plaintiff was injured was 
as he alleged it to be. The photographs also show that 
the switch points themselves had been cleaned out by 
maintenance crews, after the last precipit·ation. In other 
words, defendant had adequate time, employees and mat-
erial with which to have- cleaned the area around the 
switch stand where switchmen were required to work 
and stand while manipulating the ~witch, but had un-
fortunately neglected to clean the area around the 
switch and make it safe for the switch tenders. Two 
other shifts had been at work at the switch b-efore 
plaintiff reported for work. Sixteen hours had elapsed 
during which time the switch tender on duty could have 
taken ·a shovel out to the area of the switch stand and 
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cleaned it, or could have reported the condition to the 
section foreman in charge of maintenance, who was on 
twenty-four hour call. If the railroad company had 
kept salt or sand in the shack workmen could have 
sprinkled sa.lt or sand over the switch ties, and in the 
area "~here men· \Yere required to stand. None of these 
precautions were taken. 
The railroad clearly owes the absolute and non-
.delegable duty of exercising reasonable care in furnish-
ing plaintiff with a safe place in which to work, and 
while this duty does not require the absolute elimina-
tion of all danger, it nevertheless requires and makes 
mandatory the elimination of all dangers which the ex-
ercise of reasonable· care would remove or guard against. 
Plaintiff sincerely contends that the evidence, as 
herein outlined, was sufficient for the court to have 
granted a directed verdict in favor of the p·laintiff on the 
issue of defendant's neglect as a contributing cause of 
·plaintiff's injuries, and yet in no less than three instruc-
tions does the court invite the jury to find that the sole 
proximate cause of his injuries was plaintiff's own con-
t.ributory negligence. (See· Instructions 17, 18 and 19; 
see also the definition of ·proximate cause in Instruction 
No. 7, excepted to by plaintiff, where the court com-
pletely misconceives the law of multiplicity of causes 
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act and in-
structs on the common law doctrine of proximate cause). 
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In Melody v. Des Moines Union R. Co., (1913) 161 
Iowa 695, 141 N.W. 438, (rehearing denied in (1914, 
Iowa) 145 N.W. 466), a switchman who had dismounted 
from the engine to throw a switch in the switchyard of 
the defendant to allow the cars to be set back upon 
another track was injured as he attempted to mount the 
footboards of th·e locomotive-his left foot slipping on a 
sloping ice ridge and his right foot, which had been lifted 
to· the footboard, slipping on the ice accumulated there, 
with the result that his grip upon the handhold which 
he had seized to assist his movements was broken and he 
fell in such a manner that his leg was crushed under the 
wheels of the locomotive. In his action charging the 
defendant with negligence in failing to supply him with 
a safe place to work in that it permitted snow and ice 
to accumulate in the yard and upon the footboard of the 
locomotive to the peril of_switchmen in the performance 
of their duties and failed to remedy or remove such 
dangerous condition, it was held, as against the conten-
tion of the railroad company that the evidence dis-
closed no negligence on the p:art of the defendant, that 
the issue of negligence was one for the jury. The court 
said: 
''A switchyard is a switchman's place of work. 
The nature of his duties requires him to 
traverse the yard in almost every direction, both 
day and night. Much of his movements has to 
do with the making up, of trains, the coupling, 
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uncoupling, assembling, and distribution of cars. 
He must move with celerity. The service is at 
best essentially dangerous, and he must be ever 
alert of eyeJ and of ear to avoid being run over 
or caught and crushed between cars. He cannot 
always take careful note of his footsteps to 
make sure of his path, and within reasonable 
limit8 he must and rightfully may rely upon his 
employer to see that there are no traps or ·pits 
or obstructions into or over which he may fall 
to his injury, save only such as pertain to the 
proper and necessary preparation and equipment 
of the yard for its intended use. True, a railway~ 
company, having no control over the laws of na-
ture, is not negligent simply because snow falls 
upon its yards; but, snow having fallen thereon, 
we cannot say, as a matter of law, that the com-
pany may without neglect of duty leave it there 
indefinitely and permit it to become worn or 
trodden into icy mounds, ridges, and slopes at 
places where its switchmen are required to go in 
the ·performance of their .work, thus exposing 
them to the danger of slipping and falling to 
their serious injury. The duty of the employer 
is to exercise reasonable care to provide his 
employees a safe place to work, and is no less 
applicable to a switchyard than to a machine 
shop. True, the phrase 'safe place to work' is a 
relative one. It does not mean the absolute elimi-
nation of all danger, but it does mean the elimi-
nation of all dangers which the exercise of reason-
able care by the employer would remove or guard 
against. In the case before us it sufficiently ap-
pears that the conditions of which plaintiff com-
·plains were not the result of falling snow alone, 
but also of the use which had been made of the 
yard by the defendant whereby the surface of 
the yard became. uneven, hard, and slippery. 
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Whether reasonable care on defendant's part 
would have prevented this source of danger or 
caused its removal before the plaintiff's injury 
is a question of fact and not of law.'' 
See also Skidmore v. Baltimore & 0. R .. Co., de-
cided M·arch 15, 1948, 167 F. 2d 54, and Randenbush v. 
Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 160 F. 2d 363. For other interest-
. 1ng cases see : 
Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U.S. 459, 68 S.Ct. 140, 162 F . 
. 2d 716; .Anderson v . .Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. 
Co., 333 U.S. 821,68 S. Ct. 854; Heeb v. New York Cen-
tral R. Co., 39 N.W. 2d 44, where a railroad worker was 
-allowed recovery for frozen feet and the court held that 
so-called acts of God will not plague the injured railroad 
worker in· this class of cases since the doctrine of assump-
tion of risk has been eliminated in this class of cases. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that Judge Hendricks 
abused his legal discretion when he ruled that the jury';; 
verdict was based upon passion and prejudice and upon 
-that basis forced plaintiff to the choice of a $9,000.00 re· 
duction in the verdict or a new trial. 
It is further submitted that the instructions to the 
jury, given by a second trial court, are fraught with er· 
ror prejudicial to the rights of plaintiff. 
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We, therefore, respectfully submit that the jury's 
verdict at the second trial and judgment there·on should 
be set aside and also that the original verdict should 
be reinstated. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, BLACK, 
ROBERTS & BLACK, 
Attorneys for .Appellant, 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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